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Abstract 
Terrorism is a leading cause of concern throughout the world today. However, there is no 
consensus on how to identify, list, and target terror groups. Rather, each state has the 
ability to define, for itself, what the label of terrorist actually means. Ultimately, states 
create their own definitions of terrorism, despite a general consensus to combat terrorism. 
This leads to states creating terrorist listing regimes based on their security concerns, 
priorities, and interpretations of terrorism, allowing for variation in the listing regimes 
among states, yet cooperation between states is essential to reduce terrorist incidents. In 
this sense, the research of terror lists is particularly relevant because if these do not 
correspond to one another, then the likelihood of substantial cooperation in the field of 
counter terrorism is limited, despite most states agreeing in principle to fight terrorism. 
Moreover, there is a lack of substantial theory in Terrorism Studies capable of addressing 
these concerns. Of particular importance, there is an absence of research on the listing 
regimes themselves, regarding theoretical foundations, and the relationship between 
states lists in terms of similarity or variance.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the variation in these listing regimes, and determining 
how this variation can be explained. To do this, three alternative hypotheses are put 
forward, each of them grounded in a particular theoretical tradition in International 
Relations (IR) that provide differing explanations for the engagement of states in the 
international system. These three hypotheses, derived from the outlook of Neo Realism, 
the English School, and Constructivism, are tested to measure their explanatory power 
for the observed variation. Due to the lack of existing theory in terrorism studies, a 
secondary goal lies in connecting these neighboring International Relations theories to 
elements of terrorism studies, such as listing regimes. This is achieved in a two-step 
process; (1) through creating an overview analysis between five states, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and India, to observe variation among the 
selected states listing regimes and measure the hypotheses explanatory power, and (2) by 
 
 
completing an in-depth analysis, through content analysis, of the most representative 
case’s, in this instance the U.K., motivations for listing to examine the theory at work. 
 
The analysis has shown the complexities of applying external theories to contemporary 
terrorism studies. The results show that there is a high degree of individuality concerning 
listing patterns of states. Initially, the Neo Realism based hypothesis is the most 
representative for a comparative overview of states. However, subsequent analysis shows 
that if analyzed qualitatively, the motivations of the listing pattern do not correspond with 
certain theoretical expectations. The research has provided valuable insight to the analysis 
of terror lists and provides a connection between listing regimes to the outside 
International Relations theories of Neo Realism, the English School, and Constructivism. 
Additionally, one theory, Neo Realism, has provided explanatory potential for the 
observed variations among the lists. Terror listing regimes, remains an area in demand of 
further investigation, and theorizing in particular. As such, this thesis has laid the 
groundwork for further examinations of state terror lists and the individual motivations 
for developing official state terror listing regimes, which are highly relevant for 
contemporary international politics, and remain an area in demand of further 
investigation, and theorizing in particular.   
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Countering terrorism is a strong priority for many governments in the world today. A 
decade and a half has passed since the events of September 11th, 2001 drove terrorism to 
be one of the key concerns of states throughout the world. Despite this there is no global 
consensus on how to identify, list, and target terror groups.  The methods that states use 
to counter terrorism have direct implications on the well-being of its citizens and the 
integrity of the state. Of the methods at the disposal of states in their effort to counter 
terrorism is the process of targeting and listing terror groups as sanctioned by the state. 
States have the ability to independently create terror blacklists based on their security 
concerns, priorities, and interpretations of terrorism. This creates a situation in which 
states can create their own terror list, allowing for variation in the listing regimes among 
states, yet cooperation between states is essential to support the ongoing effort to reduce 
terrorist incidents. If the terror lists among states do not correspond to one another, then 
the likelihood of substantial cooperation in the field of counter terrorism is limited, 
despite most states agreeing in principle to fight terrorism. Due to the importance of 
combating terrorism, and particularly due to the evolving transnational nature of modern 
terrorism, states now more than ever need to hold a shared understanding of what 
constitutes terrorism and who should be labelled a terrorist. Without this, states cannot 
hope to counter a threat as large and diverse as terrorism, which is not bound by state 
boundaries or rules. Yet, since states can create their own terror lists and definitions of 
terrorism, the opportunity to share a common understanding can be lost, despite the 
general principles of being against terrorism. 
The problem of terrorism and how states react to it is not diminishing. Terrorist’s actions 
continue to dominate our news and with each new incident the question is regularly raised 
regarding what the government is doing to prevent this? The first step to understanding 
what a country is doing against terrorism is to understand who that country considers a 
terrorist group. Some governments publish official lists of the organizations that they 
consider to be terrorist groups. The topic of terror lists is especially relevant because it 
shows what groups states consider to be terrorists. While this may seem to be obvious at 
first, upon more detailed inspection it can become rather complicated. There is no 
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consensus definition of terrorism that states use to determine if a group should be labelled 
as terrorists. Rather each state has the ability to define, for itself, what the label of terrorist 
actually means. To this end states create their own definitions of terrorism, despite a 
general consensus that terrorism is something that should be opposed. By focusing on 
these lists it is possible to understand how states react to the threat posed by terrorism.   
Previous studies on the topic of terror group listing have typically focused on specific 
consequences, that is, the results of being placed on the list (Bernstein, 2013) (Peed, 2005) 
(Goede & Sullivan, 2016). Others have discussed the concept that there are leading states 
in the field of counter-terrorism and have used the lists to show where these trends are 
most apparent. (Ilbiz & Curtis, 2015)  Additionally, others have compared various state’s 
lists to one another. Particularly useful to this thesis has been the work of Benjamin 
Freedman who compiled eight terror lists into one list. (Freedman B. , 2010) However, 
there remains a lack of substantial analysis of the results of the comparative list that was 
created, and since 2010 the state’s lists themselves have changed considerably. What we 
have from this literature is a lack of definitional consensus on the concept of terrorism, 
yet a description of state lists as powerful instruments that can cause severe implications 
for the listed group or individual. These are created by powerful states and as a result it 
is possible to view trends in listing patterns and compare the lists against one another. 
Moreover, a theoretical account of listing regimes is absent, mirroring the a-theoretical 
nature of terrorism studies. 
The question that will be answered is ‘How can observed variation, if any, between the 
listing regimes of states be explained?’ The goal is to examine what variation between 
the listing regimes exists and how this variation can be described. Simply put, what 
explains the variation in the listings? In order to answer this question, three alternative 
hypotheses are put forward, each of them grounded in a particular theoretical tradition in 
International Relations (IR) that provide differing explanations for the actions of states in 
the international system. These three hypotheses will be tested to measure their 
explanatory power for the observed variation. The first hypothesis (A) posits that states 
will have highly individualized lists derived from a neo realist viewpoint on international 
relations. The second (B) hypothesizes that states’ action will reflect a desire to protect 
states that comprise the international society of states and is based on the English School. 
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And the third (C) suggests that lists will emulate a desire to protect themselves as well as 
other states with which they share a mutual identity, based on the theory of collective 
identity from Constructivist theory. Each hypothesis is grounded in theoretical 
foundations that assume attributes of the international system and of states. There is a 
lack to existing theory in terrorism studies capable of addressing this topic and therefore 
theory building is necessary to establish relevant links to neighboring disciplines, as is 
done here. Also, this contributes to these theories being measured for continued 
usefulness in explaining contemporary phenomena, such as counter terrorism policies. 
It’s recognized that these IR theories present a state centric outlook, this study consciously 
opts for such an approach because it (a) allows for focus on the response, which remains 
state-centric; and (b) in order to create linkage between terrorism studies and International 
Relations literature; (c) to learn about the explanatory potential of these specific theories 
in the age of globalization of threats, including transnational or globalized terrorism.  
 The thesis’ structure is broken into four main sections. The first will be concerned with 
detailing the background and definitional debate of terrorism, counter-terrorism efforts, 
and listing regimes themselves. The second will introduce the theoretical elements that 
make up each of the three hypotheses. The next section will introduce the case selection 
and methodology that will be used to analyze the lists. The fourth focuses on the analysis 
of the results and presents findings for answering the research question. The primary data 
which will be used are the official, publically available, terror lists from Australia, the 
Russian Federation, India, The United States, and The United Kingdom. These lists will 
be compiled into one comparative list and the results analyzed against one the three 
hypotheses with the aim to identify the hypothesis that hold the most explanatory power 
for the observations. Having identified the overall listing pattern among states, this allows 
for initial insight into the logic behind the listings. In a second step, the strength of the 
theoretical position corresponding to the observed listing pattern is further inspected by a 
qualitative analysis of one individual list in order to inspect in more detail the reasoning 
for the listing, and therefore the elements that have led to the particular listing pattern. 
This will be accomplished by performing content analysis on one of the list’s supporting 
documents which provide justification of listing. In this way the general patterns of listing 
will be identified, through the comparative list analysis, and the supporting theory will be 
expanded in greater detail through examining an individual list. 
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There are some inherent limitations when researching state terror lists. First and foremost 
are the limitations for data availability, as not all are made available to the public. While 
researching terrorism and counter terrorism in general there are additional limitations 
regarding the classified nature of many government documents due to their sensitive 
nature and ongoing use against terror groups. This means that there may be additional 
documentation or justifications that are used within a government to base their positon on 
counter terrorism that is not available at the time of this writing. Second, using a limited 
number of selected theories from another academic discipline brings with it another set 
of limitations. While the three selected schools of thought, Neorealism, English School, 
and Constructivism form part of the core literature of International Relations and 
therefore serve well to establish an initial link between terrorism studies and International 
Relations, it is in the end only three differing viewpoints. There may exist another theory 
that better explains the chosen phenomena, however the currently selected theories have 
been chosen due to the potential explanatory power and relative prevalence in academic 
literature. Third, despite the best effort to obtain the newest information available, the 
relationship between terror groups and states is a constantly moving target, and the field 
is constantly evolving as new groups appear, older groups fail to achieve their goals, 
others split to create alternative groups, alliances change, and the goals of states develop. 
The result is often that the state of the art research, by the time it is published, may not 
reflect the complete situation developing around the world. This is not to say that research 
of this type is in vain, rather it is necessary to understand the fields of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism as they exist today to further understand the changes that may occur 
tomorrow.  
The lists themselves reflect the culmination of a state’s history with terrorism, its 
definition, and the position that the state has towards terrorist groups. This thesis will 
approach the topic of listing regimes by first describing these various elements that come 
together to influence the creation of a state terror list. Then the lists themselves and their 
importance will be discussed. After that the theoretical foundations of the hypothesis will 
be detailed. Only when this has been completed can an analysis of the lists combine these 
elements and insights regarding the attributes of the state listing regimes can be discussed.
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2. BACKGROUND OF TERRORISM AND LISTING 
REGIMES 
2.1 DEFINITIONAL CONCERNS FOR TERRORISM 
 Only once the phenomenon of terrorism is understood that, in a second step, the counter 
measures can be explained. Therefore, this section introduces the definitional constraints, 
historical development, and contemporary forms of terrorism, before the next section 
explains the counter-terrorism measures in greater detail. This provides the background 
before which listing regimes, as a particular instrument of counter terrorism policy, can 
be analyzed. “Governments have developed definitions of terrorism, individual agencies 
within governments have adopted definitions, private agencies have designed their own 
definitions, and academic experts have proposed and analyzed dozens of definitional 
constructs.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 35) The basic discussion for any analysis regarding 
terrorism studies typically begins with a  focus on definitions of terrorism. In the case of 
analyzing state listing regimes, and therefore states understanding of terrorism, it is 
paramount to discuss the topic of definitions within terrorism and counter terrorism 
studies, and in particular the issues surrounding the contended nature of the term. In this 
way, understanding the definitional problems associated with terrorism studies is of great 
importance to understanding the listing regimes themselves. As the definitional problems 
give rise to different understandings of terrorism, opposing viewpoints and theoretical 
assumptions can be made regarding the effort of states to classify and counter terrorism. 
There has been a predominate focus in terrorism studies on addressing security concerns 
and providing a definition of the concept of terrorism or attempting to counter threats. 
Despite this, there is a lack of agreement regarding the definition of terrorism and the 
application of definitions to real world events. This lack of agreement can be best viewed 
as “an issue affecting studies of terrorism and other forms of political violence and a point 
of departure for much criticism within the literature.” (Martin & Weinberg, 2017, p. 12) 
In the debate within the literature surrounding definition and agreement the Routledge 
Handbook of Terrorism Research by Alex Schmid (Schmid, 2011) is a core text that 
provides a basis for the field of terrorism studies which compiles many reports and 
discuses the subject in depth. In this text Schmid provides an analysis of many topics 
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related to the field, but of particular importance for this research is his work regarding the 
problem of defining terrorism, existing theories of terrorism, and the description of 
directories of terrorism groups and events. Additionally, the debate regarding the 
definition of terrorism is an important element to consider due to the implications that a 
generally agreed upon definition would have towards listing regimes and understanding 
how terrorism fits in the various approaches to understanding violence throughout the 
world. Particularly useful for this research is the work of Sudha Setty (Setty, 2011) which 
not only addresses the problem of consensual definitions in the field, but also provides 
analysis of the comparative perspectives and varying legal definitions among countries. 
 
2.1.1 ACADEMIC CONSENSUS AND ATTEMPTS AT DEFINING 
The problems of creating a conceptual definition of terrorism have been discussed 
extensively (Martin G. C., 2013) (Dugard, 1974) (Schmid, 2011) (Setty, 2011). Here the 
distinction should be made between academic definitions and the definitions created by 
states. There have been many academic attempts to draw distinctions and categorize 
different forms of terrorism. Classifying terrorism and terrorists into different groups 
based on identifying features is useful, however, a solid general definition of terrorism is 
still required in order to proceed. To this end, the academic community is far from being 
in agreement about a specific definition. Previous attempts to formulate a definition have 
often been clouded by problems of dealing with terrorism. For instance, Dugard’s focus 
is on the problems of defining terrorism as it relates to the specific type of action taken, 
so that a broad definition did not restrict the potential for political opposition within a 
state. (Dugard, 1974) Another article that provided discussion around definitional 
problems is Teichman’s (Teichman, 1989), where the distinction is made that there is a 
large divide between the common usage of the word terrorism within political violence 
and obtaining a specific narrow definition. There is also discussion about the relativistic 
nature of the term terrorism and labeling someone a terrorist as “The same kind of action, 
differentiated by behaviourial and international characteristics, will be described quite 
differently by different observers.” (Teichman, 1989, p. 507) What has come about is a 
multitude of definitions that are modified to fit specific research aims, alternatively 
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researchers sometimes create their own that specifically fits the elements they are looking 
at.  
In the attempt to understand the definitional debate, the previously mentioned work of 
Alex Schmid (2011) is extremely useful when attempting to identify more recent attempts 
at an academic definition of terrorism. As such the revised academic consensus definition 
of terrorism (abbreviated rev. ACDT 2011) is very useful as a working definition of 
terrorism. This 12 point definition “tries to capture the core dimension of terrorism in its 
first paragraph (below in italics), with the remainder (points 2-12) 1  serving an 
explanatory purpose.” (Schmid, 2011, p. 86) The first point is the essential working 
definition that can be used; however, the other points provide clarification and support 
specific points that are often lost in a simplified definition. These additional points are 
relevant as they show how small and specific features can create a difference in opinion 
regarding their importance in finding a complete definition.  
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed 
effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive 
political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of 
calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral 
restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for 
its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and 
conflict parties. (Schmid, 2011, p. 86) 
 
2.1.2 PRACTICAL CONSENSUS AND DEFINITION PROBLEMS 
The non-academic definition is no less divided, albeit for different reasons. In this field 
definitions differ within states and between them as well. The reason for this is typically 
due to the goal or function of the defining body. For instance, many states will use 
definitions that benefits their security posture, regardless of the academic debate or 
consensus. This can take the form of vague descriptions or criteria for the inclusion of 
specific actions that single out certain groups which “encourages prejudice and 
intolerance” (Whittaker, 2007, p. 11) . Alternatively,  creating a formal definition has the 
                                                             
1See (Schmid, 2011) for the complete definition points 2-12 
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potential to “be complicated by the perspectives of the participants in a terrorist incident”, 
because they “instinctively differentiate freedom fighters from terrorists, regardless of 
formal definitions.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 35) Additionally, some states have multiple 
definitions within the government. This can be seen within the United States government 
where there are “more than 20 definitions of ‘domestic’ or ‘international’ terrorism, 
‘terrorist activity’, ‘acts of terrorism’ or ‘federal crime of terrorism’, some partly 
changing and over-lapping, some radically different.” (Carus, 2008, pp. 1-2,19,22) 
Moreover, the definitions used by these departments is subject to change over time, as is 
showcased by the State Department making changes to its definition due to the changing 
interaction of US military personal and terrorists. (Schmid, 2011, p. 46) These differences 
in definition arise due to the highly politicized nature of terrorism. Terrorists themselves 
are often attempting some type of political change, and the states that are affected by 
terrorism have experienced political changes due to it leading to the political debate 
surrounding how to respond to terrorism, and even the use of the term terrorist being a 
politically charged term.   
The United Nations has had trouble in establishing a universally accepted definition of 
terrorism as well. This runs alongside the United Nations mandate for member states to 
combat terrorism. Sudha Setty provides a concise example of the problem as “lack of a 
uniform and universally accepted definition, coupled with a mandate for strong counter 
terrorism laws and policy, has opened the door for potential abuse by member states in 
those areas in which the piecemeal international definition does not provide clarity” 
(Setty, 2011, p. 8) The mandate for strong counter terrorism actions from states is a very 
important factor for the topic of definitions and listing regimes as it sets the standard that 
states should be responsible for identifying and countering terrorists. It also provides a 
basis for the idea of terrorism being an issue that all states should respond to. Through 
the Security Council’s Resolution 1368 which directs that states should “combat by all 
means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist attacks” states were 
obliged to act against terrorism. (Combs, 2013, p. 241) Additionally, there is Resolution 
1373 which concerns the control of financing and preparation of terrorist acts. (Combs, 
2013, p. 241) As well, the UN has established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
which aims to  “promote collective action against international terrorism.” (Combs, 2013, 
p. 243) However, as Schmid details there are many shortcomings in the UN convention’s 
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proposed definition, ranging from lack of distinction for terrorism from other criminal 
acts, failing to identify civilians and non-combatants, and being generally too vague to be 
used in a legal or academic sense. (Schmid, 2011, pp. 55-57) This is critical in the 
international understanding of how nations are creating definitions of terrorism. 
Additionally, as Cindy Combs mentions regarding international law “it cannot be said to 
be an effective deterrent to terrorism” due to how the creation of law has been so “ad-
hoc.” (Combs, 2013, p. 243) The notion that states will reject the proposed UN definitions 
of terrorism due to their interests not being addressed by the definition also shows how 
important specific elements of a definition can be. This is what allows states to justify its 
actions and the designation of someone or a group as a terrorist can have serious legal 
implications. To sum up, as Setty states “If the international community or any individual 
state is to address the problem of terrorist activity, it must first define terrorism’s 
parameters.” (Setty, 2011, p. 7) If this is not done on an international level, then individual 
states will create their own definitions that facilitate the goals and response to terrorism. 
This leads to differing terror lists, targets, and goals in the field of counter terrorism. 
 
2.1.3 DEFINITION AS A BARRIER TO COOPERATION  
The competing definitions can lead to problems in an answering the international call to 
combat terrorism. Obviously if two countries have different understandings of what 
terrorism is, then it is unlikely that they will be able to effectively work together to combat 
it. The failure of the United Nations to solidify a consensus definition for the international 
community means that states can establish their own understandings of terrorism. 
Ultimately this leads to a variation in the strategy deployed to combat terrorism as the 
very understanding of the topic is under debate allowing for a state’s ulterior motivations 
to become imbedded in the terrorism debate. This debate is highly politicized due to the 
ramifications of terrorist act, as well as the amount of energy, resources, and investment 
that goes into counter terrorism efforts, not to mention the emotional price of terror attacks 
themselves. Because of this, “basic meanings are complicated by widely varying 
differences in character and motivation, and in the perspectives that represents the 
viewpoint of those who would define.” (Whittaker, 2007, p. 24) When the task of creating 
consensus and definition is left up to the state, there is no guarantee that the desire to 
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combat terrorism will remain in conjunction with other UN members. Since the definition 
is left up to states, each states experience, history, political baggage, and goals regarding 
terrorism contribute to varying definitions. This means that the understanding of counter 
terrorism strategies may develop separately and hinder a more transnational approach to 
the problem of terrorism.  
The driving forces behind these definitional problems lie in the fact that terrorism, at its 
core, is a highly contested political issue. The potential effects of terrorism on the politics 
of a state will be discussed in a later section, however it is important to note that political 
repercussions of attacks and the political discourse of safeguarding a country against 
future attacks are at the forefront of the political debate surrounding defining terrorism. 
Countering terrorism can be seen as a highly political issue between states, as well as 
within them. States are often found to be supporting groups, that another state may 
consider to be terrorists. Likewise, these debates tend to quickly become politicized 
between states, an example of this are the various groups that are currently entangled 
within the context of the Syrian Civil war. Some of these groups are receiving support 
from other states, and there are many groups, that have appeared in recent years, linked 
with the conflict that have been designated as terrorists by one state or another.  In 
addition, with the definition left up to the state, the proposed course of action for state 
listing is open to debate. This can introduce many differing positions and theories on how 
states should, and do, interact, particularly in response to a threat as significant as 
terrorism.   
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2.2 ROLE AND CHALLENGES OF TERRORISM  
2.2.1 MODERN HISTORY OF TERRORISM 
In order to better understand the motivation for states to create terror listing regimes the 
history, impact, and communicative aspects of terrorism and counter terrorism must be 
briefly discussed. In modern times terrorism has been an influential tool. With advances 
in technology the access to weapons and instruments that can create fear has grown2. 
There is a significant distinction that throughout history “terrorists are always something 
else, be they communists, nationalists, or fascist (among many possibilities).” (Law, 
2009, p. 3) This distinction draws upon the importance of terrorism as a tactic that can, 
and has been, used by many different types of actors throughout time to counter state 
authority. It is important to remember this when viewing the state reaction to terrorism, 
since the groups themselves represent many different ideologies, threats, and movements. 
To clarify the modern history of terrorism the analysis of David Rapoport3 is extremely 
useful. He classifies the modern history of terrorism into four waves beginning in the 
1880s and ending in the present day. (Rapoport, 2004) This distinction allows for a way 
to contextualize the modern history of terrorism.  
The first of Rapoport’s waves begins with Russian anarchists in the 1880s which then 
spread to other parts of the world. The increase in radical political movements, 
development of more sophisticated explosives, and the expansion of mass communication 
and literacy rates led to the perfect storm of terrorist actions. (Rapoport, 2004) Similarly, 
Law describes how Tsarist Russia led to the creation of modern terrorism as ‘radicals 
introduced the language, justification, means, and strategies that shaped the use of modern 
political violence.” (Law, 2009, p. 74) Widespread fear of terrorist’s actions began as 
terrorism was deemed a threat to all not just the elites, something that resonates in the 21st 
century as well. This fear was spread by news of the attacks which terrorized the state and 
society (Law, 2009, p. 92). Descriptions of daily newspapers running summaries of 
terrorist attacks within the country echoes the modern media of today in reporting the 
                                                             
2 For a more complete breakdown of the history of terrorism see (Brice, 2015) and (Law, 2009) 
3 Rapoport, D. C. (2004). The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. In A. K. Cronin, & J. M. 
Ludes, Attacking terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (pp. 46-73). Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
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actions of terrorists throughout the world. (Law, 2009) The anarchist wave would last 
until the 1920s when a new wave would emerge in the form of the anticolonial wave 
which lasted until the 1960s, and this wave would then give way to the New Left Wave 
which would begin in the 1960s and lasts until the end of the 20th century. (Rapoport, 
2004) According to Rapoport, in 1979 the religious wave would begin and continue until 
the present. According to Louise Richardson “there has been extraordinary growth in the 
number of terrorist groups with religious motives” and these “religious groups have 
always managed to operate across borders.” (Richardson, 2006, p. 61) These waves 
represent a shift in the focus of terrorism, from state focused understandings to larger 
religious and ideology based movements. In this sense we can see the evolution of 
terrorism throughout history as it has progressed from very state-centric goals to the 
modern iteration that can encompass a global movement. Essentially, modern terrorists 
have presented a problem for states as “these actors have no interest in interstate rivalry 
and play by an entirely different set of rules.” (Richardson, 2007, p. 68) As terrorism has 
evolved the goal to distinguish between types of terrorist groups and create labels for 
terrorists has expanded. However, as the nature of terrorism has changed, the way that 
states respond to it has sometimes lagged behind. 
 
2.2.2 TERRORISM’S IMPACT 
To understand why governments focus on counter terrorism measures, and terror lists in 
particular, it is important to understand the impact that terrorism has on states. The 
potential consequences of terrorism are a driving force behind why states have taken to 
labeling and listing groups. The main aim of terrorism is to cause change, particularly 
political, through fear and manipulation, this demand for change is the element that is 
directed at states. As Siman-Tov, Bodas, and Peleg, 2016 state “terrorisms main goal is 
to disrupt ordinary life fostering fear and helplessness in the population.” (Siman-Tov, 
Bodas, & Peleg, 2016, pp. 75-85) The fear levels that the public experiences are related 
to how the government responds to the incident. As they describe, a terrorist attack is a 
principal civic concern in many countries, yet statistically there is far more potential to 
die in a car accident or from cardiac arrest. (Siman-Tov, Bodas, & Peleg, 2016) Since 
there is “no uniform response to terrorism” (Siman-Tov, Bodas, & Peleg, 2016, p. 78) the 
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proper course of action for a country is up to debate. Terrorist attacks are not normal 
events, yet by creating an extraordinary reaction the impact on the public can be much 
greater4. Siman-Tov, Bodas, and Peleg suggest that these factors can be regulated through 
the level of preparation that a government is willing to support. (Siman-Tov, Bodas, & 
Peleg, 2016) This shows how, despite the rise of terrorism as a global threat, states are 
the recipients of violence and demands. This means that the response to terrorism, in the 
form of preparation for future attacks or retaliation for past attacks, is largely the 
prerogative of the states themselves despite the terrorist groups affiliation to spreading 
ideologies. Due to these potentially disastrous consequences of terrorist’s actions, states 
have taken to labeling and listing the groups which they view as threats. 
 
2.2.3 ACTS OF TERROR AS COMMUNICATION 
Terrorism is a very specific form of political violence, and to understand the states 
reaction, in the form of listing regimes, it is necessary to describe certain features such as 
its communicative aspects to obtain background for how listing regimes can be 
understood. These are important to understand because “terrorism is often interpreted as 
a form of political communication.” (Crenshaw, 2014, p. 557) This means, a terrorist’s 
activities are not the ultimate message; rather their message is encoded in their actions. 
(Tuman, 2010) Terrorism is essentially a communication process which is dispersed 
through public and mass communication with the goal to “create fear and signs of fear” 
in order to “imprint signs, messages, and images in our minds.” (Matusitz, 2013, p. 35) 
As such the very act of terroristic violence is communicative in nature and the response 
from a state, in the form of labeling a group as a terrorist organization and creating lists, 
can be viewed as communicative too. The fear that is spread through a society due to an 
attack is a communicative action since “it is aimed at a very large audience beyond the 
direct target.” (Matusitz, 2013, p.35) Since the victims are not only those who are actually 
wounded or killed, but the public, potential victims demand that their governments do 
something to identify and restrict potential terrorists, and states do this through creating 
terror lists. Instances of violence constitute a larger process of “communicating a message 
and generating a desired response.” (Tuman, 2010, p. 31) There is a message that the 
                                                             
4 See (Siman-Tov, Bodas, and Peleg, 2016) for greater analysis on terrorism’s political impact. 
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group is attempting to broadcast and a violent attack allows for a wider audience and 
reception as the affected society and state reacts.  
However, states take part in this communication. A terror group’s message “is still 
transactional and bidirectional because the first message generates some kind of response, 
which will always be communicated back to the terrorist.” (Tuman, 2010, p. 19) In 
response to terrorists communicative action (i.e. attack/declaration) states issue 
statements condemning the indiscriminate use of violence and discrediting their actions, 
and they may establish terror blacklisting regimes to communicate who they consider to 
be terrorists. This is because “terrorism is an act, a process, a plan intended to cause a 
response”, and this response is typically expected from the state level. (Matusitz, 2013, 
p. 37) Governments may issue declarations of war and or announce new strategies that 
will be pursued to ensure that similar violence will not ensue. When governments respond 
it shows that the communicative aspects of a terrorist action are being received by the 
target audience. Additionally, other third party groups can be involved in this 
communication cycle, including the media, other national governments such as allies or 
enemies, and non-governmental actors. (Tuman, 2010) Examples of this third party 
communicative involvement, as Tuman notes, can range from the British reaction and the 
Taliban’s reaction to the September 11th attacks against the United States. Both of these 
actors were (indirect) audiences of the communicative attack, and both heavily involved 
in the subsequent reaction that took place.  
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2.3 STATE REACTION TO TERRORISM 
To better understand the basis for creating terror lists, in light of the definitional progress, 
history, communicative functions, and impact of terrorism, this chapter will describe the 
state reactions to terrorism that have taken place alongside listing regimes. There is no 
doubt that acts of terrorism can have profound impact on people and society. The concept 
of terrorism can prove difficult to define, and can take many different forms as the 
historical and communicative context changes with it. To understand why state terror lists 
are created, how states respond to the immense disruption that terrorist’s actions create 
and how they consciously shape policy and responses in an attempt to prevent future 
attacks from occurring is necessary. This is because the relationship between terrorism 
and counter-terrorism is “mutually shaping” and “continues to determine local and 
international experience in complex and powerful ways.” (English, 2015, p. 1) Any act 
of terrorism can be viewed in retrospect as causing a chain of reactions that have escalated 
due to the reaction of the threatened state. Richard English provides a short but quite 
useful example of this when he describes how al-Qaida’s actions on September 11th 
caused a reaction of initiating a War on Terror, which in turn contributed to the war in 
Iraq, which, in part, led to the establishment of ISIS. (English, 2015) The strategy of what 
states do in the name of counter-terrorism can be thought in two ways, on one hand the 
prevention of future terrorism, and on the other the reaction, or retribution if you will, for 
an already committed act of terror. These elements lead to “an inter-relationship between 
counter-terrorism efforts, their effect on the spread of the violent jihadist ideology and 
their effect on civic harmony, civil liberties and human rights.” (Omand, 2015, p. 58)  
States are still the primary leaders in counter terrorism strategies, thus there is a state level 
reaction to what is sometimes described as a global or international threat. There has been 
a rise in concern regarding the globalization of terrorism and the spread of transnational 
terror groups. However, even though terror groups may be embedding themselves within 
global ideologies, their targets remain states. Groups that make up the most recent 
religious wave of terrorism, according to Rapaport’s historical waves, sometimes have 
objectives that are anti-Western or that pursue global jihad. (Rapoport, 2004) Despite this, 
their attacks still target the citizens and security of states, and as such states are the 
primary drivers in the policy of countering terrorism. In this way while terror groups may 
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be viewed as transnational, or the result of globalization, the state response is still the 
primary area of focus to understand the various facets of counter terrorism policy.  
 
2.3.1 STATE COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY 
State terror listing regimes are only one element of a larger counter terrorism policy 
developed by the state, but in order to understand the motivation for terror listing regimes, 
other aspects of counter terrorism policy must be briefly detailed. The state’s attempt to 
prevent terrorism has led to immense political and social changes within states. Creating 
terror lists and labelling groups as terrorists is only one of the many forms of counter 
terrorism policies that states can use. Put simply, counter terrorism deals with preventing 
and the control of terrorism. (Whittaker, 2007, p. 181) There exists an uneven relationship 
between the act of terrorism and the response a state provides to counter the act as “…far 
more money, time, person-power and violence are expended on state counter-terrorism 
than on the practising of non-state terrorism itself…” (English, 2015, p. 13) This vast 
amount of energy that has been spent on countering terrorism has brought with it many 
changes, from how state security is viewed to how modern warfare is conducted.  
States have begun to label new threats and adapt their understanding of security to 
terrorism, “At the same time the GWoT [Global War on Terror] has significantly 
challenged, and arguably altered, the expectations regarding how liberal democratic states 
can and do behave in the international system.” (Singh, 2015, p. 40) There has, 
additionally, been an increase in the expectations of what states should do in terms of 
having an obligation to prevent acts of terrorism. The United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1373, established soon after the attacks on 9/11, set the expectations for “all 
185 states supporting it to work together against the aiding, supporting, harbouring, 
organizing and sponsoring of terrorism prevention.” (Whittaker, 2007, p. 211) The 
emphasis from the U.N. on a state response is notable here. Despite the implications of 
terrorism as a global threat, states are mandated to act individually to prevent future terror 
incidents. A countries agreement with the responsibility to stop its land being involved 
with “acts contrary to the rights of other states  is evaluated in light of what the state knew 
(or ought to have known) about the threat emanating from its territory and its genuine 
capacity to aver that threat.” (Trapp, 2011, p. 65) In order for states to know the potential 
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threat to them and other states, they have had to properly identify the terroristic elements 
within their own state and, at times, other states. 
 
2.3.2 IMPLICATIONS OF COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY 
There have also been changes that have come about due to increased exposure to terrorism 
and the subsequent desire to label and restrict it. The pubic trusts the government to 
“protect the liberties and rights of the citizens, including the right to life in the face of 
murderous terrorism.”  (Omand, 2015, p. 57) Until the September 11th, 2001 attacks “the 
‘terrorism’ threat posed to liberal democratic states did not enjoy anything like the level 
of credibility that had accompanied the fear of Communism during the inter-war and then 
the early Cold War periods.” (Gearty, 2015) This has allowed for many changes to be 
made within states that would not have been possible in the years preceding the attacks.  
The state has a duty to protect the public, while at the same time the state need to somehow 
have a way to identify security threats and prevent future threats from materializing. One 
of the ways of consistently identifying threats is to create official lists of who the 
government recognizes as a terrorist. In the wake of 9/11 the US and the UK created legal 
structures designed to combat terrorists and those suspected of supporting terrorism and 
“where the US and Britain have gone, others have tended to follow.” (Gearty, 2015, p. 
91) This includes building up complex terror list regimes to label groups and target them 
as terrorists. Thus, the reaction to the 9/11 attacks “propelled to center stage new 
frameworks of laws” which are, “capable of being deployed against other groups and 
individuals deemed subversive as well.” (Gearty, 2015, pp. 90-91) This means that even 
though the intentions of the laws are to prevent terrorism, through specifically targeting 
terrorists, they have the potential to impact the rights of the vey public they are intending 
to protect.  
Possibly the most notable impact and state reaction to terrorist attacks has been the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWoT). At the heart of this are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
various operations around the world led by the United States and its allies. Armed groups 
“which are identified as ‘terrorists’ and at other times as ‘insurgents’, have contributed to 
sectarian conflict in Iraq, civil war in Syria, and civil unrest in Afghanistan and 
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elsewhere.” (Martin & Weinberg, 2017, p. 2) The GWoT represents the “most 
significant” conflict since the end of the Cold War. (Singh, 2015, p. 40) The events of 
September 11th, 2001 did not initiate the involvement of the West in this region, however 
it led to the “securitization of the region for the United states” and created a security 
industrial complex that specializes in ”counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, arms deals, 
security companies, state-building and humanitarian assistance projects.” (Brahimi, 2015, 
p. 23) These wars can be described as “humanity’s most extended, expansive, expensive 
attempt to extirpate non-state terrorism” which ultimately “prompted significant 
increases in levels of terrorist incident.” (English, 2015, p. 2) Many terror groups that 
have connections to these campaigns are identified through terror lists, and many of the 
countries that are being analyzed in the later section have been involved as well.  
Additionally, “over the past decade or so the overall character of conflict within the 
international system has changed quite rapidly.” (Singh, 2015, p. 42) While wars 
involving direct hostility among countries might occur less, non-state players will 
continue to participate in armed hostilities. (Martin & Weinberg, 2017, p. 11) By using 
war as a response to terrorism, the tools of war had to change. Since small terrorist groups 
can not directly confront the West militarily they conduct hybrid warfare that uses 
“terrorism, insurgency, propaganda and economic warfare to sidestep what has been the 
West’s conventional capability advantage.” (Singh, 2015, p. 44) Due to this the West has 
had to adapt their strategy to meet these new challenges. As the cost related to traditional 
military campaigns has increased, some states have focused on alternative measures such 
as extensive listing regimes aimed at limiting the movement and abilities of terrorist 
organizations.  
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2.4 LISTING REGIMES  
2.4.1 OVERVIEW 
Now that the definitional complications, history, communicative aspects, and counter 
terrorism policies of states have been covered in regards to terrorisms impact on the state, 
a discussion of the listing regimes themselves can begin. After listing regimes, themselves 
have been detailed, their incorporation with International Relations theories, in the next 
section, can begin. One of the tactics, aside from traditional military methods, to counter 
terrorism has been the use of designated terrorist lists, or proscribed terror lists. “During 
the post-September 11, 2001 war on terrorism, it became clear to experts and the public 
that official designation and levels  of individual suspected terrorist is a central legal, 
political, and security issue.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 39) This is an element of the counter-
terrorism strategy that has been employed to move towards “more pragmatic, 
proportionate, case-by-case response system” which has been called for during the 
GWoT. (Rubin, et al., 2007, p. 45) The listing regimes should be viewed as a combination 
of the state definition of terrorism, history, security policy, reaction to terrorist acts, and 
showing the public the states reaction. They show the groups that the specific state wishes 
to designate and legally target as terrorists since “terrorism itself is, after all a label.” 
(Tuman, 2010, p. 32) This results of being officially labelled a ‘terrorist’ can come in the 
form of travel restrictions, financial sanctions, military confrontation, legal prosecution, 
assassination, or delegitimizing the goal and actions of a group, and “depending on one’s 
designated status, certain recognized legal or protections may or may not be observed.” 
(Martin G. C., 2013, p. 39) In this vein we should view the terror lists as a list of groups 
which the listing country designates as terrorists, thus implying a change in the rights of 
individuals belonging to that group, according to the issuing country.  
 
2.4.2 LIERATURE ON LISTING REGIMES  
To understand the academic work that has already been conducted on terror listing 
regimes in particular, this chapter focuses on the efforts of specific studies. Specifically, 
literature regarding listing regimes is of great importance to this research, thus the work 
of Benjamin Freedman (Freedman B. , 2010) in 2016 must be detailed. By comparing the 
terror lists of 8 countries and organizations he shows the amount of variation that exists 
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in the lists, even among countries that are typically considered friendly and how these 
differences are dependent on a variety of factors for the listing party. The work of Ibiz 
and Curtis 2015 (Ilbiz & Curtis, 2015) provides another look at the listing regimes of 
states. They approach the topic of listing regimes with the goal of explaining why certain 
countries have similar lists and why others have completely different ones. Their work is 
very useful for understanding grouping and trends in state listing regimes. Additionally 
the work of Goede and Sullivan (Goede & Sullivan, 2016) attempts to understand how 
terrorist lists operate and has a specific focus on security lists as a governance device. 
Their analysis of the usage of terror lists describes how they have moved from simple 
catalogues to regimes in and of themselves, with their own requirements for listing and 
repercussions. Their analysis of the decisions that lead to inclusion on a list is useful when 
attempting to understand how listing regimes work. Finally, Matthew Peed’s 2005 (Peed, 
2005) analysis of the foreign policy implications of blacklisting regimes is essential for 
its in depth review of the history and use of listing regimes in both pre and post 9/11 
American politics. This allows for a more complete understanding as to the rise of listing 
regimes in the post 9/11 security and political landscape. 
 
2.4.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LISTING REGIMES 
To better understand some of the reasons that may contribute to variation in the lists, this 
chapter will highlight specific elements of the lists that may correspond to the analysis in 
the later section. Many states have counter terror lists, or recognize a list created by 
another body such as the European Union or United Nations, however most, if not all, of 
these lists are different. This is where the idea of explaining variation through applying 
theories has become relevant. Even lists using similar definitions contain different 
terrorist actors. Additionally, states are not held to their definition, that is to say that they 
do not have to list all groups in the world that fit into their legal definition, rather they 
include them if and when it of strategic significance to the state. This is because “the act 
of defining and labeling the action as terrorism also marginalizes the terrorist/aggressors, 
for it precludes any possibility of legitimacy for their cause or sympathy for their actions.” 
(Tuman, 2010, p. 40) What this means is that when a group is labeled as participating in 
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terroristic actions, they are ostracized from regular existence as a group (or individual). 
This brings out the highly politicized nature of counter terrorism policies.  
Since the politics of listing, or not listing, a group may be just as important as the actual 
countering of a group. As such the popular saying that one man’s terrorist is another’s 
freedom fighter is especially relevant. States use these discrepancies to their advantage. 
The use of vague and open definitions allows for differing interpretations of just who is 
a terrorist. The use of listing and labelling is a matter of perspective, and these 
designations are not necessarily set in stone, as Martin details in the description of how 
“the U.S. Department of Defense conferred protected persons status on members of the 
Iranian Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO)” while “this group was regularly listed 
on the U.S. Department of State’s list of terrorist organizations.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 
39)  This is where the relationship between terror lists and state definitions is strongest, 
since through interpretation a state can differentiate designating opponents as terrorists 
but friends as freedom fighters, or simply not recognize their acts as terrorism, regardless 
of official definition of terrorism. (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 35)  In this sense “the actual 
definition is not as important as the purpose for defining terrorism in the first place.” 
(Tuman, 2010, p. 39) Thus the goal for defining terrorism, for states, is not necessarily to 
create a comprehensive and  all-encompassing definition that can be universally accepted 
and used regardless of the context of the state’s relationship to the potential ‘terrorist’ 
individual or group. By using a vague definition and only apply it when it benefits the 
state the “benefactors of terrorists always live with clean hands because they present their 
clients as plucky freedom fighters.” (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 42) In addition, a state’s list 
can reflect the patterns of decisions made in this regard, and show where the focus of 
counter terrorism policy lies. 
 
2.4.4 THE FUNCTION OF LISTING REGIMES 
In order to comprehend the significance of the lists, and value to the states lists being 
analyzed, there should be an overview of their function and use. It is important to note 
that the lists only have impact through the entity that creates and enforces it. This is 
another reason that theories applied to state lists should have some state centered qualities. 
To clarify the use of the lists “these should be used in a judicious, graduated and 
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reasonably quiet manner: their bite resets in actual or potential commercial disadvantage, 
not public humiliation.” (Stevenson, 2004, p. 71) This specific reference to abstaining 
from the aspect of humiliation is an important one to consider when discussing the lists. 
The lists act as a way to inform other governments, citizens, as well as the terrorist 
organizations themselves that they have been singled out to receive special treatment by 
the state. One example is that being added to the list spreads the word that the group has 
been ‘negatively assessed’ and “puts them on notice that permissive policies vis-à-vis 
those organisations could trigger unfavourable US treatment.” (Stevenson, 2004, p. 70) 
Accordingly, the lists are not intentionally designed to shame the groups into submission 
or to humiliate its members. (Stevenson, 2004) Rather, listing is a tool that can be used 
to designate an organization, or individual, to receive extraordinary treatment.  
Since the goal of counter-terrorism is to diminish the capacity of terrorist organizations, 
this treatment tends to focus on their lifeblood; financial assets and legal rights. When 
groups have been labeled as terrorists the rights of the individual members erode as well, 
“suspected terrorists have not been designated as prisoners of war” rather alternative 
terms are used since “the rationale is that suspected terrorists are not soldiers fighting for 
a sovereign nation” this has allowed states to apply special treatment to those labelled as 
terrorists. (Martin G. C., 2013, p. 39) The U.S, in particular, has used this labelling 
technique to detain hundreds of prisoners in sites such as the Guantanamo Bay Detention 
Center. The lists function as a visible element of the state’s counter terrorism arsenal. 
While some types of terrorism can be considered a global phenomenon, the state lists 
represent the efforts of the individual states to combat the larger threat. The notion of state 
level response is important here since it is the states themselves that are largely 
responsible for counter terrorism operations and policies, even when they are directed 
against groups that present a global threat. Thus since it is states themselves that combat 
these terror threats, the lists the create to label the groups are particularly insightful. 
 
2.4.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF LISTING REGIMES 
The importance of designated terrorist lists lies in understanding the function and scope 
of counter terrorism regimes undertaken by states. As Benjamin Freedman states when 
discussing comparing blacklists “To a large degree, these lists of officially designated 
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extremist/terrorist organizations and suspected support groups highlight the security 
interests, priorities, and outlook of the particular countries…” (Freedman B. , 2010, p. 
46) Thus, examining the listing regimes of states allows for a unique view into the policies 
that states pursue as well as a practical example of the dilemma proposed by competing 
definitions. Lists are an integral component of the counter-terrorism strategies that states 
can employ. Even when facing the globalized threat posed by the modern wave of 
terrorism, the terrorists actions are largely directed at countries and the response from the 
state. It has been observed that for the U.S. government “One of its most effective tools 
is the US State Department’s official List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 
(Stevenson, 2004, pp. 69-70) States see lists as an important tool and use them, 
particularly in the legal and financial sectors. In terms of economic restrictions for 
terrorist organizations it has been noted that it is important for Western governments to 
use lists by tightening controls on funding sources such as charities that send money to 
terrorist groups, and freezing the groups assets. (Stevenson, 2004, p. 68)  
Of particular importance for those outside of government and security circles, lists are 
one of the ways to observe how states interact with terrorist organizations, since most of 
the intelligence and security elements are kept secret and classified. Indeed, some states 
have lists which are classified, while other do not have lists or adhere to another’s list. 
This makes an official list that is publically released by a state a valuable view into their 
perception of terrorism. The lists themselves can be thought of as a culmination of a 
state’s process of defining terrorism, their history with terrorism, how the states and their 
citizens are affected by it, and by the policy that the state wishes to communicate through 
to these alleged terror groups and other states. Through analyzing the lists of states there 
is the potential to understand much more about the relationship between terrorism and the 
states attempt to counter it. In the following chapter the listing regimes of five states will 
be contrasted with the theoretical understandings of the international system. In this way 
an attempt will be made to understand the patterns of the lists and how they can be 
understood on the level of the international system as states interact among a host of 
contended topics, including terrorism.  
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3. EXPLAINING LISTING REGIMES: NEOREALISM, 
ENGLISH SCHOOL, AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORETICAL SECTION 
Now that the overview of terror listing regimes has been completed, it is possible to make 
the connection between these lists and theoretical components. Currently “there is no 
consensus on any general theoretical laws of terrorism.” (Crenshaw, 2014, p. 557) This 
mirrors the theoretical problems that terrorism studies experiences, therefore, this section 
aims to bridge the gap between the current understanding of terror listing regimes, and 
the theoretical considerations of International Relations. The analysis of the terror lists is 
based on three hypotheses. These hypotheses concern the level of observed variation after 
analyzing the terror lists of countries and are developed on the basis of International 
Relations theories.  
The first, Hypothesis A, is that states will have individually exclusive lists that reflect the 
security interests and preferences of the state as an individual entity in the global arena. 
This hypothetically means that the groups that are listed, and potentially any justification 
given, relates directly to state interests and national security. This would imply that the 
lists are created by the states to pursue raison d’état. The second hypothesis, Hypothesis 
B, assumes that the states have terror lists to preserve the integrity of states and statehood 
in a non-exclusive fashion. This means that the justification for listing the groups will be 
concerned with a group’s actions universally against governments and human rights 
throughout the world and adhering to the notion of raison de systeme. The third, 
Hypothesis C, assumes a mixture of the first two, that state’s terror lists will align with 
some states, but not all. Meaning that some states will mutually identify with certain states, 
but not others, and create their lists accordingly. Following this logic, the justification 
given for listing the groups will stem from the security concerns of allies or specific states. 
These hypotheses attempt to account for the potential variation that can be observed 
between these lists.  
The reason for including wider International Relations theories, rather than drawing from 
counter-terrorism or terrorism studies theories, is twofold. Firstly, there is no concrete 
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theory on the listing regimes from within these disciplines. One alternative is to draw on 
theories from other, neighboring disciples such as International Relations, as is the 
approach taken here. Secondly, since the list regimes are extensions of foreign policy and 
security decision making procedures, with direct implications for international politics, 
existing international relations theories regarding how states interact within the global 
system, should be applicable. The reliance on these theories, carries with it some potential 
pitfalls. More generally, International Relation theories will incorporate a more state-
centric approach to the analysis due to their focus on the interactions among states. This 
is contrary to some observations of modern terrorism in a globalized context, and its 
transnational nature. However, counter terrorism policy is still derived from the state level, 
as states are the principle actors targeting terrorists. In light of this, the state-centrism of 
the theories is noted, but since the counter terrorism policy of the state, in the form of 
listing regimes is being observed, the focus of these theories is relevant. Another 
contribution of using these theories is that they are being checked for their continued 
usefulness in explaining contemporary phenomena such as counter terrorism policies. 
 The role of these theories, for our purpose, is to develop a lens to observe terror lists so 
that there is a theoretically informed base for the hypotheses. This effort at theory building, 
and for that purpose bridging international relations and terrorism studies, is particularly 
relevant since there is a lack of theory within terrorism studies that can be applied towards 
understanding various elements of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Essentially, “there 
exists no general theory of terrorism.” (Schmid, 2011, p. 202) Thus, importation of theory 
from corresponding fields is relevant as it provides a basis for understanding terrorism 
and counter-terrorism from alternative viewpoints. By applying various theories of how 
the international system operates there is an opportunity to understand how elements of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism studies fit into larger theoretical conceptions. Since 
“theoretical progress in Terrorism Studies has historically been retarded by a lack of 
definitional consensus on the subject.” (Schmid, 2011, p. 202) the importance of 
understanding the subject with outside theoretical frameworks is important.  Due to this 
lack of existing theory there is a need to establish a theoretical basis for understanding 
components of terrorism studies, particularly listing regimes. Since listing regimes 
represent a state-oriented response to terrorism, state-centric theories are applied. By 
using these external theories from international relations, we can view terrorism as a 
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challenge to states and examine the ways in which states respond within those larger state-
centric worldview frameworks.  
As mentioned, the use of these theories applies a state-centric approach to the topic of 
counter terrorism. While the phenomena of terrorism may not be purely  state-centric, as 
“terrorist groups have no interest in balancing or bandwagoning against US power” 
(Richardson, 2007, p. 69), the response to terrorism is pursued at the state level. This can 
be seen in the various definitional problems and efforts to counter, or prevent, terrorism 
that states have pursued as described in the first section. Applying state-centric theories 
then is used not to explore the phenomena of terrorism as such, but rather allows for an 
inspection of the state’s counter terrorism strategies themselves, and terror lists in 
particular. It is acknowledged that these theories may be considered as employing more 
traditional theoretical approaches, however their selection has been primarily based 
around their explanatory potential, and their reputable nature and ability to describe other 
areas of international relations, is a sought-after characteristic as they are used to describe 
something as complex as counter terrorism policies and state listing regimes. 
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3.2 THE NEOREALIST ACCOUNT OF LISTING REGIMES 
This chapter will introduce the necessary elements of neo realism and create connections 
between it and counter terrorism listing regimes. To begin this, the hypothesis and critical 
elements of the theory will be introduced, and then expected listing patterns will be 
detailed through the lens of this theory to establish it for the subsequent analysis in the 
analysis section. The first hypothesis (A) is based around the notion that states will 
individually base lists on their security interests and preferences. The justification for 
listing groups will be concerned with national security and state security interests. The 
idea here is that the states have created these lists solely out of individual foreign policy 
preferences, and it has been shown that to some extent that these lists are elements of 
foreign policy with little to no consideration for overall definitions of terrorism or the 
safety and security of other countries.  
This hypothesis assumes that the variation between the lists will exist due to each state 
having different goals and national security interests that aim to increase the position of 
the state in the anarchic self-help system that is international relations. The challenge for 
this hypothesis is the question of how the justification for being on the list fits into the 
individual national interest. To pursue this line of reasoning the realist viewpoint can be 
used as Jack Donnelly describes “Realism emphasizes the unending struggle for power 
and security in the world of states.” (Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 90) More specifically, 
“Neorealist theory, for instance, treats states as if they were individuals who try to 
maximize their ultimate aim of survival.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 164) In this 
way, states are maximizing their survival potential by identifying threats and listing them. 
The realist viewpoint that is stressed for this hypothesis is the notion of anarchy within 
the international system. This element is essential to understanding why the states would 
lead counter terrorism efforts with their self-interest as primary driver. This can be best 
described as how “in an anarchic system, where there is no ultimate arbiter, states that 
want to survive have little choice but to assume the worst about the intentions of other 
states and to compete for power with them.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) 
According to this logic there is little room for sympathy among states and the need to 
protect others will come as secondary to their primary survival. Another description of 
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this anarchic system is that “Systemic forces create incentives for all states to strive for 
greater efficiency in providing security for themselves.” (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 
2009, p. 4) The cause of this anarchy is described as the result of human nature and lack 
of international supervision. (Donnelly, 2000, p. 9) Which in turn means that “In 
international relations, anarchy not merely allows but encourages the worst aspects of 
human nature to be expressed.” (Donnelly, 2000, p. 10) Meaning that states should be 
focused on selfish behavior that ensures their own survival and security. In theory, this 
should be visible in security documents such as terror lists. A key element of this anarchic 
system is the element of uncertainty since “pervasive uncertainty and potential threats are 
central to the conception of anarchy in neorealism.” (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009, 
p. 28) The anarchic system coupled with uncertainty paints a picture of an international 
system that is comprised of states ruthlessly engaged in self-preservation. This is not to 
say that there is a particular focus on forcing other states into less secure positions, rather 
it is a focus on how states are individual actors within the anarchic system and how 
“Whether or not by force, each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests.” 
(Waltz, 1979, p. 113) This can be best surmised as “self-help is necessarily the principles 
of action in an anarchic order.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 111)  
The self-interest of the state is paramount here. The neorealist perspective on international 
relations as established by Kenneth Waltz in his book Theory of International Politics 
lends itself as a particularly useful lens for this. According to Waltz, each unit must be 
able to place itself in a position that allows for it to care for its own needs. This is 
instrumental since it supposes that states will act independently in regards to terror listing 
programs. As viewed from this perspective each unit’s incentive is to put itself in a 
position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so. 
(Waltz, 1979) The theory set forth in Waltz’s book does not attempt to address domestic 
politics and decisions, and this is not the aim of the research, rather it attempts to explain 
why, despite the growing economic interdependence between states, the relations among 
states will remain based upon individuality of the actors. Another viewpoint on this is that 
“because other states are potential threats and because there is no higher authority they 
can turn to if they are attacked.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) This is especially 
relevant to terrorism since no other state responds or is impacted in the same way as the 
targeted state. In this self-help system units worry about their survival, and the worry 
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conditions their behavior. (Waltz, 1979) The notion of self-help in an anarchic system 
leads to the sense that there are high levels of competition. It should be noted that, as 
Dunne describes, there is not a denial that states can create alliance structures, “however, 
states have no choice but to put their own interests ahead of the interests of other states 
as well as the so-called international community.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) 
In this sense a state’s interest would be countering and identifying terrorism for its own 
protection. The emphasis on individual priority is the leading feature here and it creates 
a distinct understanding of how states should behave when listing terror groups.   
Corresponding to these principles of realism regarding how states should act, Hypothesis 
A recognizes that the states lists should have high levels of individual listing preferences. 
That is, a comparison of states terror lists will present a high degree of individuality. This 
should be based on the self-interest of the state, and due to the importance of security for 
the state. Terrorism, as detailed in the previous chapter, poses a significant threat to states 
security, both in terms of direct confrontation, but also in the form of changing the 
relationship between states and citizens, and how states react to non-state actors. Because 
of this it is expected that a majority of the state’s lists will correspondingly be concerned 
with specific groups that the state, and potentially no other states, view as problematic. In 
addition, the difficulty in forming a definitional consensus regarding terrorism means that 
states, despite having international mandates to counter terrorism from the UN, have a 
large degree of freedom to independently define and target groups on their lists.  
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3.3 THE ENGLISH SCHOOL ACCOUNT OF LISTING REGIMES 
This chapter introduces the theoretical elements of the English School as it pertains to 
Hypothesis B, and creates connections between this theory and state listing regimes that 
will be used to evaluate the hypothesis in the later sections. The second hypothesis (B) is 
based on the assumption that states’ action will reflect a desire to protect themselves and 
other states that comprise the international society of states. The justification for listing 
groups will be concerned with the threats that groups pose to the states that make up the 
international society, as well as the threats they pose to governments and human rights 
throughout the world. The idea here is that states have created their lists out of the desire 
to protect themselves, as member of the international society of states, and their fellow 
members of the society of states. Thus this position takes into account that states may 
have some consideration for the international attempt at defining terrorism and that the 
safety and security of other countries can be a factor for determining which groups 
become listed. This is because the society of states is itself comprised of states, it is 
concerned with the safety of its members introducing the concept of raison de systeme.  
This hypothesis assumes that the variation between the lists will be minimal, taking into 
account the different national definitions and direct threats that each country may 
individually face, and that there will be an observable amount of cohesion between the 
listing regimes of states. Accordingly, country cares, not only about itself, but also about 
the well-being of other states. The challenge for this hypothesis is the question of how the 
justification for listing complies with the idea of international society preservation and 
not simply self-preservation as we have previously noted. To pursue these assumptions 
viewpoints from the English School will be used which are based in the notion “that the 
international system is more orderly and civil than realists and neo-realists suggest.” 
(Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 89)  and since there is “a very high level of order, and 
surprisingly little interstate violence, in the absence of a higher coercive authority.” 
(Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 88) More specifically this view assumes that states are not 
locked into an anarchic individual struggle for self-survival as dramatically as the 
previous hypothesis assumes, rather that they are embedded into society, and follow 
shared rules and institutions allowing for relative order and co-existence.  
31 
 
 The particular focus of the English School used here is the idea of international society, 
which assumes that states act as members of a society with the goal of preserving the 
society of states. This international society “exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another, and share in the working of common institutions.” (Bull, 1977/2002, p. 13) What 
we have then is a rather different view of the international system that places higher regard 
for the shared interests and values of states. We can see this regard for shared interests 
and values through the number of international organizations that states belong to, and, 
“international society is about the instutionalisation of shared interest and identity 
amongst states.” (Buzan, 2004, p. 7) This is not to say that these institutions become more 
powerful than the states or approach a sort of world government rather, it proposes “that 
states can enjoy the benefits of society without transferring sovereign prerogatives to a 
higher authority.” (Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 95) Thus the states retain their 
sovereignty but they are still the primary driver behind the common institutions. As such 
“it is states themselves that are the principle institutions of the society of states.” (Bull, 
1977/2002, p. 68) This means that states make up the international society through the 
establishment of norms and values and expressly via their instutionalisation through 
institutions, within which the states are the dominant powers.  
The preservation of the international society is of particular importance since it can be 
used to understand how states will react not only to direct threats, but also to threats 
elsewhere in the society of states. They “have established by dialogue and consent 
common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their 
common interests in maintaining these arrangements.” (Bull & Watson, 1984, p. 1) Since 
institutions are made up of sovereign states “threats to those institutions are existential to 
both the units and the social order.” (Buzan, 2015, p. 131) This means that threats which 
appear to target the institutions should be recognized as threats by all those who comprise 
the units which make up the international society. Additionally, when a member of the 
international society is under threat it would follow that other members of this society 
would take steps to aid and protect it. This can be surmised as “when the IS [international 
society] is attacked by an anti-systemic force, its self-defense mechanism, operated 
through its state units, should become most apparent.” (Mendelsohn, 2009, pp. 296-297) 
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Terrorism can be seen as such a threat due to its pervasive nature and ability to impact 
each state that makes up the society. Because the state units are the sovereign actors 
within the international society and there is no higher authority the only other actors that 
can come to aid the threatened member are the other states which belong to the 
international society. Hence we can see how this understanding of the international 
system assumes that states have reasonable justification to protect and support more than 
just their own national interests and, at times, will identify threats that do not necessarily 
pose a direct existential threat to themselves, but rather pose a threat to the other members 
of their international society.  In essence “due to the desire to maintain the system, states 
are expected to relax their inclination for egotistic self-serving considerations and to 
collaborate in order to fend off the threat.” (Mendelsohn, 2009, p. 297) In this sense, terror 
lists are expected to reflect this proposed collaboration. 
Consistent with the ideas of international society, common values, and an interest in 
maintaining the society of states, Hypothesis B prescribes that state lists will reflect these 
desires. In other words, a comparison of states terror lists should show a high degree of 
corresponding listings. Despite the problems presented by a lack of definitional 
consensus, states should instead use the vague definitional boundaries to list many groups 
according to the protection of society. This sentiment is presented in the UN mandate 
against terrorism and the states lists should have a majority of corresponding groups that 
are commonly listed. This is not to say that the lists will be completely identical. The very 
nature of states creating lists outside of the UN framework against terrorism indicates that 
there will be some degree of divergence, however this should only be at a minimal level 
with a majority of commonly listed groups that represent a threat to the international 
society.  For terrorism in particular “violence-wielding non state actors such as Al-Qaeda” 
are a threat to “legitimacy not just of states but also of international society.” (Buzan, 
2015, p. 132) Thus the reaction that is expected by Hypothesis B is that the states lists of 
will have many commonly listed groups which represent a desire to counter threats to the 
legitimacy of international society.  
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3.4 THE CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT OF LISTING REGIMES  
This chapter presents the relevant theoretical elements of the Constructivist account and 
build connections between it and counter terrorism listing regimes in the form of 
Hypothesis C. To begin this, the hypothesis and essential elements of the theory will be 
introduced, and then expected listing patterns will be detailed through the lens of this 
theory to establish it for the subsequent analysis in the analysis section. The third 
hypothesis is formed around the assumption that a states’ action will emulate a desire to 
protect themselves as well as other states with which they share a mutual identity. The 
justification states have for listing groups on their respective terror lists will be concerned 
with not only their protection, but also of a collective of states that they identify alongside. 
The idea here is that states have created their lists out of a desire to protect themselves 
and other specific states with whom they identify. Accordingly, states will not act entirely 
independently nor will they act unanimously when addressing terror groups. Rather, some 
states will form a collective identity, other states will not identify with this collective and 
follow their own individual security interests or form their own collective security interest 
with other likeminded states.  
The reasoning for the inclusion of terror groups on the lists will be concerned with the 
security of allies or specific states, rather than the society of states or just the self. This 
hypothesis assumes that the variation between the lists will reflect these collective 
arrangements and there will be groupings of states that have similar listing preferences 
and other states that have dissimilar lists. To pursue these assumptions, and the notion of 
collective identity, the assumptions of constructivism will be used which are based on the 
idea that “international relations is a social construction rather than existing 
independently of human meaning and action.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 163) As 
such states interact based on social constructions which have been cultivated over time 
and through previous interactions. This view assumes that states will not operate on a 
purely individual basis, as is prescribed in the first hypothesis, nor will they pursue a more 
universal approach, as is prescribed by the second hypothesis, but rather they will operate 
under smaller collective associations which have been formed through previous 
interactions and mutually held positions.   
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The notion of shared understandings and normative values are at the core of this theory. 
As such the constructivist viewpoint is extremely useful to understanding how states 
should interact on the international level. The emphasis on the social aspects of 
international politics are of particular importance. More specifically “the fundamental 
structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material” and “these 
structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behaviors.” (Wendt, 
1995, pp. 71-72) The shaping of identities and interests, as described by Wendt, is a 
fundamental part of understanding the international system and how states interact within 
it. The culmination of these identities and interests are the formation of collective 
identities, when these identities and interests align. In light of this collective identity 
formation can be described as interaction caused by “interdependence, common fate, and 
homogeneity” coupled with “self-restraint.” (Wendt, 1999, p. 357) This does not negate 
the individual desires of the states, rather these individual desires are found to be shared 
with other states, creating a bond between them for a specific purpose. This bond may 
exist for many areas, and is expected to be visible for the purpose of preventing terrorism. 
Thus having an interest alongside another state “does not mean that actors are irrational 
or no longer calculate costs and benefits but, rather, that they do so on a higher level of 
social aggregation.” (Wendt, 1994, p. 386)  
This describes a system where the basis for understanding the ‘Self’ is contrasted with 
how the ‘Other’ is understood. States have understandings of where they stand in relation 
to their ‘Self’ and other states and then can differentiate between these other states based 
on how they might mutually identify. States will act towards other states based on the 
way that states perceive each other. In other words, further cooperation “presupposes that 
actors do not identify negatively with one another.” (Wendt, 1992, p. 418) Therefore, if 
some states identify negatively with one another, it leads to limited cooperation in counter 
terrorism efforts. And as a continuation of this logic when states are able to further 
cooperate and they share similar interests and values they are more likely to include other 
actors in their understanding of ‘self’ thus creating groups or ‘we’. 
The notion of collective identity is based on this conception of ‘we’. Being part of a group 
like this “gives actors an interest in the preservation of their culture.” (Wendt, 1999, p. 
337) As these collective identities are strengthened through mutual understanding there 
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is also a move in the direction of protection of this collective. Terrorism, or the treat 
thereof, can be seen as a threat to the culture. This introduces the topic of collective 
security which, simply put, “refers to collective action in response to a collectively 
identified threat.” (Orakhelavshvili, 2011, p. 4) The pursuit of collective security means 
that the states place an importance in the protection of other elements of the collective 
with which they identify. Simply put, “collective interests mean that actors make the 
welfare of the group an end in itself.” (Wendt, 1999, p. 337) This creates a system which 
“requires states both to renounce the unilateral use of force for their own ends, and to 
come to the aid of other states that are the targets of aggression.” (Cusack & Stoll, 1994, 
p. 388)  
For the sake of counter terrorism this would be using security structures, such as terror 
lists, to target terror groups that pose a threat to certain other states. Wendt has described 
this as a security system where “states identify positively with one another so that the 
security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all.” (Wendt, 1992, p. 400) This 
works because as a collective “the group of states which unites around a set of common 
values and principles” have the ability to “safeguard them and preserve or restore the 
states of things that they require.” (Orakhelavshvili, 2011, p. 11) Thus the collective 
identity fosters the need to defend itself, placing the protection of the unit alongside the 
defense of the individual units, or in this case states. The use of terror lists, is then justified 
not only to protect one’s own state, but also extended to protect those who are identified 
as sharing the collective identity. Since terrorism is such a potentially destructive force 
for the individual states, it follows that to preserve the system states will list relevant 
terror groups.  
Conforming with the principle of collective identity and correspondingly collective 
security, Hypothesis C recognizes that a comparison of state’s terror lists will show strong 
correlation among certain states, however other states may have different listing 
preferences. In this way, when comparing the lists, countries that belong to group sharing 
collective identity should have a high degree of similarities. Other states are expected to 
have lists that are substantially different from the states in a collective arrangement. This 
can also be thought of using the labels trendsetter, trend followers, and individual players. 
(Ilbiz & Curtis, 2015) In this way the states will react differently, and form groups 
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showing collective identity (i.e. trendsetters and trend followers) that have high levels of 
consistency in their lists while some states, who are not part of the not collective (i.e. 
individual players), would have separate lists that do not correspond to the others.      
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4. METHODOLOGY  
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND EMPIRICAL PUZZLE 
Despite the consensus to combat terrorism, as indicated by the UN directives against 
terrorism and the threat that terrorism poses to national security, there is a large degree of 
disparity in how states define terrorism and label terrorist organizations. This difficulty 
in defining the concept of terrorism makes it an essentially contested concept, especially 
due to the disputed nature of the phenomena. Coupled with the discrepancy surrounding 
an academic consensus on a definition as well as state definitions, the issue of defining 
terrorism, and subsequently countering it, is complex. The reason being that states should 
attempt to counter terrorism, since it poses a threat, yet states react differently and have 
different understandings of what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist. As 
previously discussed, states have competing methods and understandings when it comes 
to terrorism, yet they have all predominantly agreed to counter it. This creates a puzzling 
situation where there has been an indefinite agreement in response to the threat of an 
essentially contested concept. Through using the terror lists given by states it is possible 
to see how their definition is manifested in a real world context since the groups being 
listed have been designated as terrorist using a state’s particular understanding of 
terrorism.   
Through analyzing a state’s listing preference, the working of the mechanism of one of 
the three hypothesis posited above can be inferred regarding the anticipated nature of the 
terror lists. Hence an analysis of the lists should provide an illustration of these theoretical 
expectations at work. This will be completed in two stages: (1) Identifying a potential 
listing pattern, which will then be checked against the hypotheses. (2) Checking if the list 
documentation corresponds to the theoretical reasoning; this will be done by examining 
the justifications provided by the state and seeing if it corresponds to the theoretical 
expectations. Combined, this approach allows for the viewing of a pattern of behavior to 
become apparent based on the theoretical viewpoints that have been established through 
the hypothesis. Essentially the analyzed lists will provide an illustration of the theoretical 
expectations at work and, as such, will look at the listing pattern to observe how it 
corresponds to the theoretical expectations set forth through the hypothesis. This allows 
for an analysis that examines the empirical case of the listing regimes while placing it, if 
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it fits, within the input pattern established by the larger theory governing the international 
system. Thus, the goal is to first establish the empirical listing pattern; and second, to 
check if the justification provided for the empirical listing matches the theory behind the 
related pattern. 
 
4.1.1 CASE SELECTION 
The states that have been selected to observe patterns of variation are the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Russia, India, and the United States. These five states are 
particularly insightful for understanding terror listing regimes due to their leadership in 
countering terrorism either on a regional or a global level as well as their policy of 
targeting terror groups through labelling and listing regimes. Additionally, these states 
have been selected based on the comparison, compiled by Benjamin Freedman in 20105, 
in which eight lists were compiled. During this study it is noted that there was “less 
overlap than anticipated” (Freedman B. , 2010, p. 46), however the reasons for listing, or 
connection to larger theory in general, was not examined. The comparative list that will 
be created for our purposes will only focus on five of the eight that were originally used 
by Freedman. This is due to the aim of establishing connections to the hypothesis and 
theoretical assumptions, thus some of the lists will be excluded. The excluded lists are 
from the European Union and United Nations. This is due to the supranational nature of 
these organizations, since here we are interested in the interactions of states in the 
international system. Additionally, revision of this comparative list is necessary since 
these lists have been updated as countries have changed their focus since 2010. Since this 
time each of these lists have been updated by their respective government with the 
Australian list in November 2016, U.K. in December 2016, U.S. in June 2016, India in 
March 2015, and Russia in August 2015.  
For the second stage of analysis one list will be selected and the justification provided for 
listing groups will be examined. The list will be selected based on the following. Of the 
five state lists that are included in the comparative list, one will be chosen. It must provide 
a clear example of the trend that is identified through the hypothesis selection. That is, it 
                                                             
5 (Freedman B., Officially Blacklisted Extremist/Terrorist (Support) Organizations: a Comparisos of 
Lists from six Countries and two International Organizations, 2010) 
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should represent the listing pattern that has been identified in stage one. More detail on 
the specific list will be provided in the description of step two of the methodology after 
the comparative list has been compiled and analyzed. 
The confidential nature of this topic further complicates the case selection. Not all states 
have publicly available official terror lists. Additionally, while states may declare certain 
groups as terrorists, they may do so only in specific circumstances and might not publish 
it in an official list but rather a declaration or statement. Thus, one important restrictive 
element is the availability of having publicly available official terror lists. This limits the 
number of countries that can be examined greatly, for example many EU states do not 
individually publish a terror list in the same way that the previously mentioned five states 
do. Other states, such as Turkey, do not identify the organizations as such, rather they 
identify key individuals who have been identified by the state as terrorists. While these 
individuals often are members of larger terrorist organizations, the nature of their list 
differs greatly from the other selected states. This is a key factor while selecting the cases, 
as having a relatively similar format is important for efficiently analyzing the lists 
themselves. Thus, only states that have a list format for declaring their designated terrorist 
organizations are selected. These lists are released on the corresponding government 
webpage and one, the U.K. list is published as a document. In the case the U.S. the list is 
from the Department of State. The U.K. and Indian governments release this information 
under Home Office and Home Affairs respectively. The Australian government releases 
under the Australian National Security body. Russia has created a National Antiterrorism 
Committee which publishes their list on its website. Some states do not pursue large scale 
sanction campaigns against terrorists because they treat terrorism as a criminal matter. In 
these cases, the rule for responding to terrorism at the state level is represented in the 
criminal code and terrorist organizations and individuals are treated as high level 
criminals rather than special security actors.         
To examine the patterns in the best feasible way it is important to look at states that will 
not preclude one of the hypothesis due to other factors of their relationships. For instance, 
if countries were only selected that belong to a collective defense organization, then it 
may appear that all states follow common listing patters when only this grouping of states 
have a collective security arrangement. To prevent this, countries have been selected that 
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represent elements present in each of the hypothesis, there are allies, members of 
collective security arrangements, as well as countries from different parts of the world 
and which have different security concerns. The only common feature between these 
countries, for the sake of this study, is that they have officially published terror lists. For 
instance, while the US and UK both belong to NATO, Russia, India, and Australia do not. 
Additionally, the selection of countries representing states all over the world, from Asia, 
North America, Oceania, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. This allows for local, 
regional, or global concerns over terrorism to be represented depending on the state listing 
preferences. These states represent differing state structures and governance types; 
however, the aim is not how a specific form of governance responds, but how states that 
form the international system do. That is to say, if state structure or governance type plays 
a significant role, then it should be reflected in the comparative list and offer an 
explanation for the observed variation.  
Differences exist in the formats and style of the lists themselves, however they each 
provide a type of list with the name of designated organizations. The Australian 
government has, on its website, a Listed terrorist organisations page6 that is derived from 
the Criminal Code Act 1995, which was updated in 2002 to include terrorism 
organizations. In the U.K. there is a document entitled ‘Proscribed terrorist groups or 
organisations’7 published by the Home Office. The Russian Federation terror list is titled 
the ‘Unified federal list of organizations, including foreign and international, designated 
as terrorist by the courts of the Russian Federation’8 and is available on the website of the 
National Antiterrorism Committee. The Indian list is released by the Government of India 
on the Ministry of Home Affairs website as ‘List of Banned Terrorist Organisations under 
section 35 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.9 The list being used from the 
United States is the U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organizations10 released 
by the Bureau of Counterterrorism on their webpage.  
                                                             
6 https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx 
7 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2 
8 http://en.nac.gov.ru/unified-federal-list-organizations-including-foreign-and-international-
designated-terrorist-courts.html 
9 http://mha.nic.in/BO 
10 https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
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4.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
4.2.1 STEP 1: COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
The first step is to create a comparative list (Figure 1) that organizes all of the selected 
state lists. This is done by compiling the five separate lists into one workable document, 
creating a new master list which contains all the terror organizations that are referenced 
in the individual lists. This comparative list also contains the five states along another 
axis. An example of this is provided in Table 1. In this way, the potential variation will 
be observable between which lists contain similar or different groups. It also clarifies the 
frequency of the listing, in other words, if a group is listed by one, two, or all of the states. 
This is done through viewing the lists in their various formats and placing the relevant 
information into the new chart. Due to these various formats, which are all digitally 
published but differing website styles and layouts, each countries list will be approached 
individually and the named terrorist organizations placed within the comparative list.  
The lists are published by different countries, thus there is a possibility that translation 
differences of the organization names will occur when they were placed on the state list. 
First organizations which appear in multiple lists and are spelled the same, clearly 
reflecting the same organization, will be compiled. Next, the groups which names contain 
minor spelling differences will be checked to verify that the intended group is properly 
referenced. While some groups are simply spelled differently for instance translations 
from Arabic commonly use different combinations of ui, i, or e to produce the same sound, 
however at times this can indicate a different name, particularly depending on how the 
state has chosen to translate since many groups share common phrasing in their naming. 
These groups, and corresponding countries, will then be uploaded into the comparative 
list using the most commonly recognized spelling of the group’s name. The remaining 
groups will be those that are only recognized by one state. These will be checked to verify 
that the organization is not already listed under another designation by other countries. 
These naming differences will be uploaded into the list referencing the most commonly 
used and up to date international name for the organization, where major naming 
differences occur the alternative group name will also be listed alongside. In order to 
account for these spelling and naming discrepancies the supplemental material provided 
with some of the lists will be used, when this is not sufficient the databases of the 
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Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium 11  (TRAC) and the Global Terrorism 
Database12 (GTD)  will be used to clarify any transcription or discrepancies encountered. 
This will ensure that the correct group is being referenced each time despite potential 
naming differences. The remaining groups, which are not alternative names for 
previously uploaded groups, will then be uploaded to the comparative list under the 
assumption that only one state has listed the group. These will be checked against the 
databases again to confirm that they are separate entities from the other groups. In the 
situation where branches of an organization are listed by one state but not another, but the 
main organization is listed separately, the branch or wing will be listed separately as well. 
This is to account for states choosing to differentiate between an entire political group or 
a particular wing of a political group as being a terrorist organization.        
TABLE 1 
 State 
Name 
State Name State Name State Name 
Listed Group A 
(a.k.a alternative 
name) 
    
Listed Group B     
Listed Group C 
(branch of B) 
    
 The comparative list displays the number of states that list a specific terrorist 
organization. This allows for an overview of listing patterns among selected states. The 
number of groups that are only listed once, twice, three times and so on will be recorded. 
Through this one of the previously mentioned hypotheses can be selected for further 
testing. The hypothesis is selected based on the following criteria for selection accounting 
for the possible hypotheses. For Hypothesis A, based in the self-interest of the state, the 
criteria will be that the organizations which are only listed once and, consequently, are 
not listed as terrorists by the other states, make up a majority of the listed groups. This 
will be recognized as being 50% or more groups being individually listed. For Hypothesis 
                                                             
11 https://www.trackingterrorism.org/ 
12 https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
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B, based on protection of the international society of states, the criteria will be that a 
majority of the states have corresponding lists and that groups will be listed by three or 
more states 50% of the time. For Hypothesis C, based on the idea of collective identities, 
the criteria will be that a grouping forms where some groups of states have 50% or higher 
correlation and others do not. In order to test these hypotheses, the percentage or times 
listed will be compiled as (1) comprehensive, all the compared states, (2) a selection of 
three states which have the highest degree of compatibility, and (3) a selection of two 
states who belong to a common collective security arrangement. It is expected, due to the 
exclusive nature of the hypotheses, that upon completion of the comparative list one 
hypothesis will explain the results. The comparative list, in a sense, would provide an 
illustration of the hypothesis in action. Since each of the three hypotheses are derived 
from theory about the international system, the theories assumptions should correspond 
to the reason for the matched hypothesis. In order to test this, a more detailed exanimation 
of one of the lists will be done. 
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4.2.2 STEP 2: CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Step two identifies the reasons why one of the states has justified their listing in order to 
test it against the hypothesis’ theory. Once a proposed hypothesis has been selected 
further testing is required. This will be achieved through analyzing the content of the most 
likely case’s, that the observed hypothesis suggests, documents to see if it corresponds 
most closely to what the proposed hypothesis suggests, therefore it is also expected that 
the justifications to be most pronounced. If the theoretical expectations are prominent 
anywhere, they should be apparent here. As previously described one of the five will be 
selected for this element of the research. This documents will be analyzed according to 
the content analysis scheme described by Robert Weber. (Weber, 1990) Accordingly, the 
recoding units will be the sentences that make up the justification for each terror 
organization’s inclusion on the list. Content analysis allows for us to understand the 
problems associated with the variation of terror lists because it clearly displays elements 
of the lists in a way that allows for discussion. By being able to focus on key indicator 
words, content analysis highlights the trends of a list and allows for observations to be 
made. Justification for each group is approximately a paragraph or two in length. The 
sentences of the justifications will be classified for each of the terror groups included in 
the list. A sentence will be counted where reference is made to self, other states, or is 
general, these will be defined later in this section.  
The specific focus is references to the groups location, targets, area of operation, or goal 
etc. Examples of location or area of operation would be the words: based, in, located, 
across, or a specific country name such as Yemen or France. Additionally, words 
indicating actions or sentiments will be recorded in order to emphasize the nature of the 
sentence. For instance, in a sentence a group may be listed as opposing France or carrying 
out attacks in Yemen. The format will be the following Action – Subject, for example: 
attack – French citizens, or indicating word – location, such as: based in - Libya. 
Sentences which do not contain reference to these criteria will be not be listed since they 
do not contain an indication of where and why the group is being listed, and for our 
purposes do not indicate why the government has listed a group. Through labeling each 
sentence under these categories it is possible to observe the trends of the justification 
provided in the listing document. According to the hypothesis selected in Step 1 the 
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justifications in the individual list should reflect the assumptions made about why states 
have created their lists. 
Examples of Actions 
 Attack, bombed, killed, reject, support, resist, target, destroy, fighting, criticize, 
carried out, operates, oppose  
Examples of words indicating location 
 Based, in, from, within, originated, throughout 
For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to describe in more detail the subject and what is 
meant by self, other states, and general. The first, Self, is concerned with identifying 
sentence elements that make specific references to the listing country. This is found as 
descriptions of the terror group threatening the security of the state, its citizens, interests 
abroad, or being active in the country It is important to distinguish here that it is 
specifically the interests of the state or protection of its citizens that is being referenced 
here. Examples of this would be condemnation of an attack against its citizens abroad or 
the organization specifically targeting the listing government. 
Examples of Self reference (listing state is Spain for sake of example) 
 Country Name(Spain), abbreviations (ES), Citizens (Spanish, Spaniards)   
The second, Other States, is concerned with identifying sentence elements that make 
specific reference to states other than the listing state. This is found as descriptions of the 
terror group threatening the security of other states, condemning actions pertaining to 
other states citizens, or describing the involvement of another state when it does not 
pertain to protecting the listing state. The distinguishing feature here is that the 
government’s specific justification concerns the safety of another countries citizens or is 
citing a groups attacks against another state. Examples of this would be condemnation of 
a terror attack against another governments security forces or citizens.  
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Examples of reference to other states (assuming the listing state is not one of these)  
 State Names i.e. United States, USA, America, Israel, Jordan, Egypt 
 City Names i.e. Cairo, Paris (Use of these reference the state to which the 
city belongs. For instance, an attack in Paris is also an attack against the 
French.) 
 Regions, with specific reference to a part of a country i.e. Punjab region of 
India, or Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) of Northern Iraq. 
 Specific groups of countries i.e Coalition Forces, African Union. These 
indicate a specific set of countries.    
The third, General, is concerned with identifying sentence elements that refer broadly to 
terrorist actions against a number of states or people. This is found as descriptions of the 
terror groups affront to human rights, democratic values, or peaceful institutions without 
specific reference to either the listing state or other states. For this classification the term 
West, or Western, is considered general since a group being referenced as anti-Western 
does not specify a targeted state or nationality and is rather an indication of the groups 
general position. This classification also contains descriptions condemning terrorist’s 
actions against humanity or international norms. Here it is important to distinguish 
between justification for including a group due to the actions of the group against 
commonly held values, not specifically an individual state. Examples of this would be 
condemnation of a terror groups actions against people, without specific reference to their 
nationality, or because of their noncompliance with international norms and human rights.    
Examples of general reference 
 Global, International, international community, multi-national (used 
generally), world, U.N., peacekeepers 
 Regional, without specific reference to a part of a country i.e. West or 
Western influence. 
 Crimes against humanity      
This coding scheme allows for the state’s justification of including groups on its terror 
list to be tested against the theoretical assumptions that are indicated from the hypothesis. 
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The hypothesis, and consequent theory, is identified through the formulation of the 
comparative list that is a compilation of the individual state’s terror lists. Accordingly, 
the results of the content analysis should correspond to the theoretical assumptions made 
by the hypothesis that matches the comparative analysis of the lists. If the content analysis 
results match the theoretical criteria that justify the hypothesis, then it can be confirmed 
that there is correlation between the listing patterns and the hypothesis is derived from 
the theory. However, if the content analysis results contain discrepancies against the 
theoretical criteria, then there is a lack of correlation between the listing patterns and 
hypothesis from the specific theoretical viewpoint and another explanation is necessary, 
or there may be mitigating factors. Nevertheless, there would be no direct connection as 
suggested by the theories.  
TABLE 2 *ALSO USES SPAIN AS AN EXAMPLE OF A LISTING COUNTRY 
Group Name Sentence # Key Words Classification 
Example A    
 1 Action – Subject Classification 
 3 Indication – Location Classification 
Example B    
 1 Kill – Spanish Citizens Self 
 3 Based in – Spain Self 
Example C    
 2 Attacked – American Other States 
 3 Based in – Iraq Other States 
 
  
48 
 
4.2.3 LIMITATIONS 
There are some limitations that arise from this type of analysis. Firstly, there is strong 
focus on the receiving side, that is to say that states have the preeminent position in this 
analysis rather than descriptions of terrorism or actions of terrorists themselves. While 
the actions of terrorists have caused them to be recognized by states, and subsequently 
listed, this analysis has not been developed to measure the different types of groups that 
are listed and measure their impact on state listing. Therefore, it remains a possibility that 
the type of group plays a role in the observed variation between states list, as much as the 
states themselves. Also, there may be a need to fine tune the measurement of cohesion 
between states. One possible reason for this could be that the threshold is set too high to 
reflect realistic levels of cooperation. The question then would then be what is a sufficient 
level of agreement on these types of lists to indicate the potential to form collective 
identities? For the sake of this analysis the current thresholds will be kept, however it is 
important to note that this element may be revised in further examinations of the subject.    
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5. ANALYSIS 
5.1 COMPARATIVE LIST ANALYSIS 
Now that the phenomena of terrorism, and the states reaction to it through listing regimes 
has been explained, the theoretical connections to International relations theories 
established through hypotheses, and the methodological framework has been detailed the 
fusion of these previous sections can begin. These previous elements provide the 
necessary background for the lists, as well as create connections between the different 
theoretical viewpoints in a way that can be applied in the context of analyzing the lists 
themselves. The following analysis sets out to describe the actual lists within the 
frameworks created above.  
Once compiled the Comprehensive List 13  totaled 146 groups originating from five 
different state lists. There is a large degree of differentiation that is observable and little 
cohesion, showing the divisive nature of defining and labelling terrorist organizations. 
The trend is that as the number of states that agree on listing a group increases, the number 
of listed groups decreases. Of the 146 organizations only seven are listed by four or more 
states and only 21 are listed by three or more states. Of these only three are listed by all 
the states; Al Qaida (AQ), The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Lashkar-
e Tayyiba or Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Correspondingly, only four groups are listed by four 
states, these are: (1) Al Nusrah Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, which is listed by 
Australia, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. (2) Harakat-Ul-
Mujahideen a.k.a. Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) which is listed by Australia, India, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom, (3) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which is 
listed by Australia, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and (4) Jaish-e-
Mohammed (JEM) which is listed by Australia, India, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom. Fourteen groups are listed by three of the states out of the 146. Twenty-seven 
out of 146 groups are listed by only two states. An overwhelming 98 out of 146 
organizations are included on only one state list.   
                                                             
13 See Annex 1 for the complete Comparative List 
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The highest degree of correspondence occurs between Australia, the United States, and 
the United Kingdom. Despite having the highest degree of compatibility, their lists still 
contain many differences, there are a large number of groups that are not equally 
represented across these three states. Compared to any other combination of three out of 
five states, however, these still represent the highest level of similarities among their lists. 
For the sake of testing Hypothesis C this will be the three state group of the highest 
compatibility. Between these three states there are 101 listed organizations. Only 17 
groups are listed by all three of these states. Twenty-five groups out of 101 are listed by 
two of the states. Reflecting the trend that is highlighted in the comprehensive list, a 
majority of the listed groups are only listed by one of these three states. 59 out of 101 
groups are only recognized by one of the three states. Considering that these three states, 
out of all five, have the highest degree of commonly listed organizations, it is highly 
indicative of the overall trend that these three states still have so many individually listed 
groups. Additionally, the selection of two states belonging to a collective security 
arrangement shows little common listing patters compared to individual listing 
preferences. The United States and the United Kingdom, who are both members of 
NATO, have a combined 101 groups on their lists. Of these 101, only 36 are found on 
both of their lists with the remaining 65 being listed by only one of these two states.  
 
5.1.1 CORRESPONDING HYPOTHESIS  
According to the criteria for selecting a hypothesis, established in the previous 
methodological section, there should be a clear level of (in)compatibility between the 
lists. The level of compatibility is compared on three levels as (1) comprehensive, (2) a 
selection of three states which have the highest degree of compatibility, and (3) a selection 
of two states who belong to a common collective security arrangement. For the (1) 
comprehensive list, 67.1% of the groups are listed by a single state.  Subsequently, 18.5% 
of groups are listed by two states, 9.6% by three, and 2.7% by four and 2.1% by five. (2) 
Among the three selected states, Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom 
the corresponding values are 58.4% individually listed, and 41.6% listed by two or more 
states. This breakdown has 24.8% of groups being listed by two of the three states and 
only 16.8% of groups being listed by all three states. (3) Between the two states belonging 
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to NATO the corresponding totals equaled 64.4% of the groups being listed by only one 
of the two states and only 35.6% of groups being listed by both states. These figures will 
now be compared against the criteria that was set for each hypothesis.  
Hypothesis A, highlighting the self-interest of the listing states and assumes that there 
will be a high degree of mismatch between the lists due to the self-interested nature of 
states proposed by neo-realism. According to the selection criteria this hypothesis most 
closely matches the observable variations in the comparative listing scheme. The set 
criteria were that 50% or more of the groups would be individually listed and appear on 
only one state list. Among the comprehensive list, 67.1% of the lists are listed by only 
one state and groups are only listed by two or more states 32.9% of the time, showing a 
preference for self-interest. These results match this hypothesis and indicate that a Neo 
Realist viewpoint can sufficiently explain variations in the comparative state list. The 
additional inspection of the three state selection and NATO countries contribute to the 
same determination. Of the three states, AUS, USA, UK, 58.4% of groups are only listed 
one time, indicating that each country has listed primarily groups that it deems as a threat 
to themselves and not to other states. Only 16.8% of the groups appear on all three of 
these states lists indicating that these groups have targeted or threatens each of these states 
and that is why they have been listed, not out of a desire to protect each other. Between 
the two NATO states there exists a high degree of divergence between the lists with 
64.4% of the groups appearing on either the list of the USA or the UK, but not on both. 
This runs in contradiction to what is proposed by both the international society and 
collective identity theories, which assumed larger overlap in the lists.    
Hypothesis B, which focuses on the protection of the international society of states, 
required that an overwhelming majority of the states have corresponding lists and that 
groups will be listed by three or more states 50% of the time. As is previously described, 
groups are rarely listed by all five countries making up only 2.1% of the listed groups. In 
fact, even combining groups that were listed by three or more out of five only shows that 
only 14.4% groups are listed three or more times, showing a lack in unity for defending 
the international society of states proposed by the English School. Regardless, according 
to the comparative list that has been compiled there is only agreement regarding three 
terror groups, hardly an indication that all the states have created lists in order to 
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internationally combat terrorism.  However, Al Qa’ida is one of the universally listed 
groups, highlighting Buzan’s description of “violence-wielding non state actors such as 
Al-Qaeda” as threats to “legitimacy not just of states but also of international society.” 
(Buzan, 2015, p. 132)  
While this hypothesis assumed that the threat terrorism poses to all countries, as threat to 
the society of states, as well as the UN’s attempts to curtail terrorist groups, would lead 
to a global consensus of targeted terrorist groups there is little evidence that this is 
reflected in the listing regimes of these five states. Rather, the high levels of individually 
listed groups, as well as groups only listed twice, indicate that there is a lack of consensus, 
or willingness, in the way that states choose to approach countering terrorism. If states 
cannot, in any meaningful way, commonly identify and list terrorist groups, then there is 
little chance that there is any form of protection of the international society of states 
regarding terrorism and counter terrorism. Due to this Hypothesis B is not considered to 
be applicable to the comparative list results.  
Hypothesis C, presumed actions in support of collective identities, requiring that groups 
form where some groups of states have 50% or higher correlation and others do not. While 
the immediate results show that a vast majority of groups are listed by only one state it 
does not rule out the possibility that other states have similar lists and that one state has 
provided many individual groups. In order to test for this the three most common state 
lists are reviewed to test for the possibility of the influence of a collective identity. In this 
case the three states with the most corresponding lists are Australia, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom. Once the Russian and Indian lists were excluded the total 
number of listed groups decreased from 146 to 101 (a 30.8% decrease) and the number 
of individually listed groups decreased from 98 to 59 (a 39.8% decrease). However, even 
among these three states the percentage of groups listed one time remained high at 58.4%, 
with only 41.6% of the groups being listed  by two or all of the states. Compared to the 
comprehensive list the number of groups that are all listed by the three states is much 
higher at 16.8% compared to 2.1% previously. This indicates that these three states have 
a higher degree of cohesion in counter terrorism understanding than other countries in 
general, perhaps showing “interest in the preservation of their culture” as suggested by 
Wendt. (Wendt, 1999, p. 337) However, this still did not meet the required 50% threshold 
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set in place for determining these three states terror lists to represent a collective security 
interest. Similarly, when only two countries, who belong to a common collective security 
organization, are compared the results are underwhelming. The United States and The 
United Kingdom, both members of NATO, only have a 35.6% overlap in their lists. A 
majority, 64.4%, of the groups listed between these two states appear only on one of the 
countries lists. Thus, there is still not enough correlation between the lists to indicate 
common listing policies as suggested by the views on Constructivism’s collective 
identity. This suggests that for these countries, counter terrorism is primarily driven by 
domestic concerns. At its current state, the results show that while there are some minimal 
levels of overlap in the lists, a majority of the groups are listed by only a single state 
indicating that the lists themselves do not emulate states desire to pursue collective 
identity formation in regards to counter-terrorism.  
The results showing that a majority of the groups are listed by only a single state could 
be caused my different factors. One such factor is that the driver for state listing could be 
focused on domestic concerns. This would make sense in regards to individual listing 
patters, since the states would be focused on groups that pose the most concern to 
themselves, resulting in highly individualized lists and showing raison d’état at play. This 
could also explain the trend between the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia, since groups may have anti-Western positions, these countries would all be 
targeted, resulting in each country listing the group separately. While this gives the 
appearance of a common listing, each country could list these types of groups solely based 
on the individual threat. In addition, if we consider the historical waves of terrorism, as 
described by Rapoport, (Rapoport, 2004), the relative newness of the fourth wave of 
religious groups with more ideological leanings than the previous state-centric views on 
terrorism could potentially explain the results. The previous waves of terrorism are 
concerning the state and domestic changes, and only with the most recent wave is the 
focus changing from state level changes to global movements. The groups that are 
recognized by all, or a majority, of states could be a representation of this new wave of 
terrorist groups. Al Qa’ida and ISIL for example have presented new ideas of what the 
face of terrorism is, and as the threats have changed, so has state’s understanding of the 
threat. In this way, the states themselves are changing how the view and categorize 
terrorists based on the changing nature of terrorism. However, it takes time for states to 
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change the way in which they think about terrorism, and that could be why we see a 
transition from one wave to another, in the form of directing attention to a new type of 
terrorism.  
 
5.1.2 HYPOTHESIS A: NEO REALISM AS MOST LIKELY CASE 
Hypothesis A has the most explanatory power in determining why the observable 
variations in the comparative list. According to this hypothesis the reasons for a state to 
include terrorist organizations in their list will be mainly driven by self-help logic, and 
individualistic security concerns of Neo Realism. This is supported by Waltz as he 
described the way in which “each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its 
interests.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 113)  Meaning that groups being listed by predominately one 
state represents an individualized understanding of terror threats. This should be due to 
the individualistic nature of the states counter terrorism focus and raison d’état. The high 
percentages of individual listings show that other considerations such as collective 
identities or the international society, and the threats posed to them are not necessarily 
understood equally among these states.   
Despite self-help seeming to explain most of the observed pattern, some groups present 
universal agreement regarding their status as terror groups. If it were not for the relative 
minority of groups listed this way this could indicate elements of other theories, such as 
the international society and collective identity at play here. This may be explained by 
the waves of terrorism proposed by Rapoport. (Rapoport, 2004) Most of the waves have 
historically been state-centric, thus the state’s understanding of terrorism has developed 
in this way. With the evolution of terrorism to become more religious and ideological 
based, as well as an increase in globalization, states have had to adapt their understanding 
of terrorism to encompass the new threat. Therefore, the leaders of this, such as ISIL and 
Al Qa’ida, are listed universally while most other groups are still labelled in light of the 
neo realist account of their threat to individual states.   
By getting an overview of the variation between the lists themselves the justification for 
including groups in the lists is not obtained. The following section will analyze the 
reasons that a state has included organizations on their list. In this way there will be further 
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specification regarding the reasons for the observed pattern of listing. This will inform 
about whether or not the self-interest and selfish nature of states is to explain for what has 
been observed as a high degree of mismatch between states lists and a tendency for states 
to list organizations that are not listed by other states. Based on the observations of the 
comparative list and the criteria of Hypothesis A there is a high degree of variation 
between the lists indicating little overlap in terms of defining and determining what 
groups are terroristic threats. The neo realist viewpoint describes that states will be 
primarily concerned with self-interest in their listing regimes. This was assumed to be 
reflected in the degree of observed variation in the lists, and the subsequent analysis has 
indeed shown a large amount of variation between the lists. This means that the neo realist 
account of seems to be at work here and states are forming their lists out of concerns of 
self-interest, however only after analysis of the justifications can this be corroborated.  
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5.2 IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE U.K. LISTING REGIME 
Now that the overall listing pattern has been established, an in depth analysis is required 
to verify the theoretical underpinning that has been used to establish Hypothesis A. For 
our purposes neo realism’s position of self- help and egoism, as connected to terror 
listings in the previous sections, is expected to feature prominently. Based on the results 
of Step 1, the United Kingdom’s list has been selected, due to its being the most like case, 
to be further analyzed in Step 2 as detailed below. This case represents the most likely 
reflection of Hypothesis A, since it displayed the strongest connection to the observed 
pattern of individual listing. In the case of the U.K. the Proscribed Terrorist Organisations 
list and the supporting information is provided from the Home Office in a document 
published 12 July, 2013 and last updated July 15, 2016. As the Home Office states: “This 
document lists the extremist groups or organizations banned under UK law, and provides 
the criteria that are considered when deciding whether or not to proscribe a group or 
organization.” (U.K. Government, 2016) This document represents a unique case because 
the United Kingdom has one of the most extensive listing regimes in the world. Details 
about the groups are provided by the Home Office through justifications, concerning 
details about the group such as terror incidents they have been involved in, area of 
operation, modus operadi, relationships with other organizations, and key figures within 
the group. The document stands out because it represents the matched hypothesis, based 
on the neo realist view of self-help, in that it contains 31 groups which are listed only 
once out of the 98 that are found on the comparative list, despite being a part of the U.N. 
and NATO. This suggests an individual listing pattern that is most closely linked to the 
self-interested account of listing patterns contained in hypothesis A’s, Neo Realist 
account. The next countries that came close to the U.K.’s number of singe listing is India 
with 30 and the United states with 23. Russia’s list contained 14 single listings and 
Australia’s had none. 
The completed analysis found 223 references to the actions or location of groups that 
provided justification for the U.K. government’s listing. Every justification contained at 
least one description of the actions or location of the group in reference to why it has been 
listed. Of these 223 references 155 were categorized as Other States, 45 fell under the 
General category, and only 23 were labelled as Self. This means the self-interest and the 
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“self-help system” described by Waltz, (Waltz, 1979), is not reflected strongly in the 
justifications. Additionally, some group’s listing is solely justified based on one 
classification type. For example, a group’s justification is made up by many sentences, 
each of which can be classified under a different category, for some groups each classified 
sentence belonged to the same category. This was most common for the Other States 
category with 31 groups solely justified with sentences that corresponding with the Other 
States label. In terms of theory this can be interpreted as the fostering of collective identity 
formations and the dismissal of purely self-help motivated decisions. The General 
classification while used for 45 different sentences did not provide the sole justification 
for any group. The Self classification was used to label the sole justification of 4 groups. 
Most group’s justification sentences contained a mixture of classifications. 33 group’s 
justifications were classified based on a combination of the three classifications. This 
shows that most groups are justified using a combination of reference types.     
  
5.2.1 OBSERVATIONS  
The analysis shows that the classification of groups is predominately centered around the 
category of Other States. Contradicting the proposed self-help nature of the terror lists 
proposed by Neo-Realism. This classification means that a sentence contained reference 
to a group’s action or location which concerned another state or group of states, and not 
specifically the United Kingdom. This shows that the United Kingdom’s primary focus 
during the process of identifying and labelling terrorist groups lies in groups that are not 
necessarily focused on the United Kingdom itself.  This means the self-help and egoist 
elements are not as prominent as suggested by the initial analysis. Whereas the overall 
pattern seemed to confirm neorealism and self-help principles, as pursued in Hypothesis 
A, the pattern of this individual list, although expected to match most closely with the 
Neo Realist hypothesis and therefore also be driven by self-help principles, displays 
significant concern with other states. This means that, at times, the justifications seemed 
to follow the patterns set forth by the other hypotheses. There is no doubt that groups 
which are a threat to the U.K. are acknowledged and listed as well, but the overall trend 
was listing non-U.K. based terror groups, which have a primary focus in fighting another 
government elsewhere in the world.    
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There is a noticeable trend of listing groups which are based in certain regions of the 
world. The Middle East, Asia, and Africa are the most represented, while only a small 
number of groups are listed that have formed in Europe. In addition, there are a significant 
number of Islamic groups that are described as having an ideology which supports global 
jihad or the establishment of a caliphate. These groups’ resistance to Western influences, 
and in some cases Western military forces, is largely cited as a reason to be included in 
the list. In terms of theory this means that there are cases of support for other countries 
that matches with the collective expectation set by constructivist based Hypothesis B. 
Few groups, which are not based in the U.K., are described as being specifically against 
British interests, direct threats to security, or threats to British citizens at home or abroad.  
There are many specific references to groups that operate in states other than the United 
Kingdom, and their attacks or operations against other state’s governments are included 
in the justification for the British listing. This is interesting in light of the proposed Neo 
Realist viewpoint that argued “states have no choice but to put their own interests ahead 
of the interests of other states as well as the so-called international community.” (Dunne, 
Kurki, & Smith, 2016, p. 54) Additionally, a majority of the groups are described as 
having goals related to other states or regions. Very few groups are described as 
specifically being against, or targeting, the United Kingdom, and in fact, a majority of the 
descriptions of a groups actions, in the form of attacks, bombings, or attempts, are 
concentrated in other countries and concerning the governments and citizens of other 
states. This would indicate a preference towards another theoretical view that emphasizes 
other states, such as the notion of collective identity or international society. However, 
when a group does become involved with the United Kingdom in some way, either by 
targeting its citizens, operating within its borders, or engaging militarily against it, it is 
very prominently described in the provided justification.  
The groups which are listed often represent specific countries or regional conflicts. These 
are highly indicative of an Constructivist idea of collective identity where states “come 
to the aid of other states that are the targets of aggression.” (Cusack & Stoll, 1994, p. 388) 
An example of this are groups who operate in Egypt, Palestine, and Israel and who target 
the Israeli and Egyptian state. The justifications specifically reference the threats these 
states face from terrorism. The political tensions linked to the conflicts in these countries 
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seem to be a motivator for listing groups. Likewise, there are many groups listed which 
operate in Pakistan and India. These listings correspond to the Indian state list, potentially 
reflecting political support for the government of India, since these groups do not contain 
specific references to the United Kingdom. This is also reflected in the number of groups 
which are referenced as participating in the Syrian Civil War. Many groups that 
participate in the conflict are listed, and some of these are universally listed in the 
Comparative List, such as ISIL. However, the British list contains many groups that are 
listed due to affiliation to ISIL. These groups range from being listed only by the U.K., 
and other states, but never by all states, showing the difficulties of applying the label of 
‘terrorist’ in a real world context, particularly when political tensions are high.  
The observations are in contrast to the expectation that many of the justifications would 
be classified as Self, and represent more egoistic, self-help patterns There are many 
discrepancies between the theoretical expectations, the observed listing pattern, and the 
justifications for listing. The British list contained the most single listings of the five 
state’s lists analyzed in the comparative state list, since other states did not list these 
groups the hypothesis assumed that the reason was due to self-interest of the listing state 
and a primary concern with its own security. Thus, the expectation was that the U.K.’s 
listing tendencies would show a large focus on the Self category reflecting the individual 
nature of their list as proposed by neo-realism. There are 31 groups that only appear on 
the British list in the Comparative list. Hypothesis A proposes, in line with neo realist 
thinking, that by highlighting the self-interest of the listing states, it is assumed that there 
will be a high degree of mismatch between the lists due to the individual nature of states.  
This individual nature of states is theoretically supported through the contributions of the 
neo realist school of thought which assumes that states will be self-interested and focused 
on groups that have the potential to harm or otherwise impact the listing country. This 
has not been observed through the justifications provided by the United Kingdom in their 
listing document. While there are some groups that have specifically been referenced due 
to their actions against the state, this does not make up a significant number of the listing 
categories. This is apparent from the fact that the Self categorization is only found for 23 
sentences in the justifications of the listing document and only 17 groups contain a 
sentence categorized as Self at least once in their justification. Subsequently, only 4 
60 
 
groups are solely classified as Self, meaning that few justification sentences are recorded 
only containing references to the U.K. in some form or another. These instances of the 
category Self being used do not make up a significant number of the justifications and 
does not correspond with the theoretical expectations set by the hypothesis. There seems 
to be more collective identity components to the list than initially expected based on the 
neo realist underpinnings of the selected hypothesis.   
 
5.2.2 OTHER STATES CLASSIFICATION 
A majority of the justifications are categorized as Other States. This is contrary to the 
assumptions about Neo Realist reasons for individual listing, which is that the states lists 
will be different due to concern over its own security, the list shows a great deal of concern 
over the actions of terrorist groups in other countries and targeting other states. Despite 
having a large amount of individual listings, the British list seems to be primarily 
concerned with the actions of terror groups in other countries. For instance, many of the 
listings make reference to a groups attacks against foreign military forces such as Ajnad 
Misr, which is only listed by the U.K., and is attributed to attacks against the Egyptian 
security forces as well as bombing Cairo University. Within this justification there is no 
reference made to the U.K. or the threat that this group poses to the country. This means 
that while the state’s list does represent an example of a state creating their own 
independent list, the portrayal that states “put their own interests ahead of the interests of 
other states as well as the so-called international community.” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 
2016, p. 54) is not apparent. Interestingly, and contrary to the expectation of groups 
uniting “around a set of common values and principles” (Orakhelavshvili, 2011, p. 11), it 
seems that there is identification with Egypt, showing a pattern of identification, but not 
with traditional allies such as other European states or the USA, but rather with former 
colonies and territories. Since some of the groups which are only referenced by the U.K. 
are justified due to their actions against other states it may be that only the UK views 
these actions as terrorism, or that it is in the U.K.’s interest to protect the government of 
another state, even if other states do not share this sentiment.  
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Out of 223 justifications155 fell under the Other States category, meaning that more than 
half of the justification sentences that are found in the listing document produced by the 
U.K. government are concerned with other regions or countries outside of the U.K. and, 
perhaps more importantly, the U.K.’s interest is not being cited as a reason for listing the 
group. This shows a large degree of correspondence with the theoretical nature of 
international society and collective identity, as the security concern is not solely focused 
on the self. This means that a group such as Ajnad Misr may be only listed by the U.K., 
and not by the other five countries analyzed in the comparative list, for another reason 
than the immediate threat that the group poses to the U.K.   
 
5.2.3 MIXED CLASSIFICATIONS 
A majority of the group’s justifications contained sentences that have multiple references 
to differing categories. This was apparent for groups that had longer justifications, 
especially when their described actions and locations concerned many different actors, 
countries, locations, and goals. An example of this is Al Murabitun, which has a 
justification that contains all three categories; Other States, since the group is active in 
Algeria, General, due to the groups global Islamic ideology, and Self, due to the groups 
being responsible for the death of British citizens. Similar classifications can be found for 
the Haqqani Network (HQN), which is based in Afghanistan, desires to eradicate Western 
influences, and is responsible for attacking British embassy staff, and ISIL, which is 
active in Iraq and Syria, pursues a global jihadist ideology, and facilitates the recruitment 
of British nationals as foreign fighters. There are usually multiple reasons that a group is 
listed. These examples show how complex the relationships between the listing state and 
the groups themselves can be. However, it should be noted that mixed justifications only 
appeared with all three classification types 10 times, and most concerned only two of the 
three classification types, with combinations containing Self being found the least. This 
shows that for most groups, the reason for justification stems from multiple sources, 
depending on the type of group and their goals and operational capacity, and the U.K. 
government has used many different areas to justify their listing. Ultimately, the category 
of Self is rarely used, and when it is, more often than not, it is used in conjunction with 
other sentences referring to the Other States and General categories. 
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5.2.4 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION 
The next most prominent classification, after Other States concerns sentences that fall 
under the General classification. This classification was used when justification for listing 
a group is concerned with the groups ideologies, typically in the form anti-Western 
actions or calls for global-jihad, affiliation with other large terror groups, or outcry against 
the groups actions in a general sense without reference to other states. Few groups have 
been listed whose justification contains only a specific reference to this category, meaning 
that the existential threats “to both the units and the social order” described by Buzan, 
(Buzan, 2015, p. 131), have not been substantially represented. One example, Al Ittihad 
Al Islamia (AIAI) is listed as being in Somalia and Ethiopia, yet the only other 
justification for its listing is that they are aligned with a global jihad ideology, the listing 
of this would be best explained through application of the international society 
framework. However, in most other cases when a group has a justification sentence that 
falls under this category it is only one element of the justification. Other referenced 
elements of the specific actions of a group are used, such as Al Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI) 
which is referenced as overthrow - Egyptian government, being categorized as Other 
State, and removal - Western influence, being categorized as General. In this way the 
groups listed on the U.K.’s terror list are not designated as terrorists solely due to factors 
related to the General category, rather these act as supporting facts that add to the 
justification as to why a specific group should be listed.  
This classification is most typically found when a group has a declared ideology that seeks 
some type of change outside of national borders or a specific region or when a group is 
described as being anti-Western. Some groups have individually pledged goals of this 
type, and for others the anti-Western position and call for global jihad go together. Others 
have pledged support to larger groups that embody calls for global jihad or the 
establishment of a caliphate such as Al Qa’ida and ISIL. Listing these groups then 
resonates with the idea that “when the IS [international society] is attacked by an anti-
systemic force, its self-defense mechanism, operated through its state units, should 
become most apparent.” (Mendelsohn, 2009, pp. 296-297) In both of these cases the 
British list rarely use this as a sole reason for listing a group as a terrorist organization 
showing that ideologies, while important for a groups identification, is not as important 
as the actions a group has taken to achieve their goals within this ideology. This also 
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shows the limitations of applying international society theory to terror lists, since the 
country that a group operates in, and their relationship to the listing state is more 
important than the ideological threat it provides the society of states. 
 
5.2.5 SELF-CLASSIFICATION 
The category of Self was used the least during the categorizing of sentences of the 
justifications, meaning that despite the neo realist expectation of self-interest and anarchy 
in the international system most of the justifications were concerned with other elements. 
Only 23 sentences can be described as referencing Self. Despite the fact the proposed 
hypothesis and neo realist theory which assumed self-interest would feature prominently, 
only 17 groups have at least one sentence with a reference to Self, showing some form of 
connection to the United Kingdom. One common use of this category was concerning 
groups that are responsible for the death, injury, or threat thereof regarding British citizens. 
There are 6 sentences referencing the threat, death, or injury of a British citizen in this 
manner. Another common justification is the group’s participation in military actions 
against coalition forces, NATO, or Multi National Forces Iraq (MNF-I). There are also 6 
sentences referencing these types of actions against military forces, which are included 
under the Self category due to the U.K.’s participation.  
Interestingly, there are two sentences that reference British citizens being complicit in 
terror attacks linked to the terror groups. This was found in the form of a suicide bomber 
being a British citizen, and another in the form of recruiting British citizens as foreign 
fighters. Of these 17 only 4 groups are justified for inclusion on the list solely from 
sentences categorized as Self. These groups are Al Ghurabaa, Minbar Ansar Deen (Ansar 
al-Sharia UK), National Action, Saved Sect/ Saviour Sect. These groups are all described 
as being based in or operating across the United Kingdom and having a direct purpose of 
terrorist activities in the country, either through planning or encouraging violence, or 
through operating as a proxy for other terror groups outside the U.K. to receive foreign 
fighters and funds from Britain. These are the examples on the list that appear to be driven 
by the state taking care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so as described 
by Waltz. (Waltz, 1979) 
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5.2.6 GROUPS ONLY LISTED BY THE U.K. 
 As previously established by the Comparative List 31 groups are listed only by the UK. 
The justification for listing these groups was expected to be concerned with ‘self’ in some 
way based on neo realist expectations of self-interest. These represent some of the cases 
where self reference is used in the list. However, there is no indication that a group’s 
justification which contains Self is exclusive to the British list. There are some groups 
such as the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) which contains no reference to the Self 
category and instead only contains one reference to Other States. This group is not listed 
by any other states on the Comparative List, and therefore it is assumed that the group 
should be included because of self-interest of the U.K., however the only category found 
is Other States as it is based in Pakistan. So, while the U.K.’s list has the most individual 
listings, these listings are not necessarily centered around the U.K. and the justifications 
for listing these groups appear to be dispersed between the General, Other States, and 
Self categories. One particularly notable case is the group Jamaat UI-Furguan (JuF) which 
is only found on the British list. The justification contains references to the Other States 
category as the group is described to be promoting the destruction of India and the U.S., 
two other states that are both included in the Comparative List. Yet the U.S. and Indian 
lists both omit this group, and there is no reference to Self from the British list in including 
this group on their list. This shows a case where the United Kingdom has individually 
listed a group that the other states have not themselves listed, and the provided 
justification for listing concerns these other states that do not themselves label this group.  
 
5.2.7 DISCUSSION  
Ultimately, the In Depth Analysis does not corroborate the hypothesis and connected 
theory in any concrete way. As previously discussed, the expectations for the analysis of 
the U.K.’s proscribed terror list are not reflected in the observations of the list. While 
there are groups that the U.K. lists solely based on individual concerns, they do not make 
up a majority of the groups included on their list. In fact, very few groups are included 
based on this reasoning. Many more groups are included based on the actions against and 
concerns for other states. In light of this, it can be said that Hypothesis A, based neo realist 
axioms such as raison d’état, self-help, and anarchy, does not explain the individual listing 
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trend presented in this list, despite its explanatory potential for the Comparative List. 
While it explained the observed variation between the selected lists, the logic it utilized 
does not extend to the individual list. Many of the specific details concerning each of the 
categories used has been described above, however in general there was a preference of 
the Other States category being predominately used and most groups justification sections 
being mixed with Other States sentences forming the majority, and the General or Self 
references used more frequently in support.  
No group is listed solely based on its General classification showing that location, in the 
form of a country or region, and where a group’s actions take place is a more important 
element in how the U.K. views and identifies terrorist groups. In this sense, groups are 
being listed because they are targeting certain states, their citizens, and interests rather 
than simply because they are engaged in terroristic activities or because they are listed by 
other states or the U.N.   This means that the English School idea of international society 
in Hypothesis B is not reflected, but rather Hypothesis C, with collective identities 
towards certain states. However, when an alleged terrorist group is active against the U.K., 
or within the borders of the U.K. in particular, they can be listed without any other 
justification related to other states. If no other state considers them terrorists, but the U.K. 
does, they will list them regardless.   
In a sense, each of the three theoretical viewpoints can explain a small portion of the 
observations produced in the individual list analysis. The neo realist assumptions put 
forward in Hypothesis A can be seen in the groups that are listed due to their actions in, 
and against, the U.K. Yet, this does not extend to describe all the groups, and the 
assumptions put forward by the other two hypotheses can also be found in examples 
throughout the justifications. For instance, there are many cases of groups being listed 
due to their actions against other states, this can be seen as an example of the 
Constructivist expectations where the British list includes groups due to their desire to 
protect or assist another state that they identify with. Additionally, there are also example 
of groups being justified in part due to their adherence to global terror movements and 
general anti-government activities. In these we can see the examples of the English 
School’s theory at work as groups are justified as being labelled terrorists based on their 
belief in global jihad against the world order, or their position as anti-Western. Rather 
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than attempt to explain all of the choices of the list within one theory, it is beneficial to 
apply a case by case approach to each of these terror groups justifications. Each is justified 
for a different reason, at different times, and therefore the theory that best explains it may 
be different as well, or one overarching theory may not work best.   
There are several plausible explanations for the mismatch between the chosen hypothesis, 
selected on the basis of the findings for the overall listing pattern, and the qualitative 
analysis investigating justifications. This could be because groups have been listed at 
different times, and as such represent different forms of terrorist threats to the listing state. 
Here the work of Rapaport14 is once again referenced and the theory of terrorism waves 
can be used to view the different series of challenges that terrorist have presented 
governments. Some of these groups adhere to a global agenda, rather than the more state 
centric agenda of past terrorists. Thus some groups, particularly those who adhere to a 
general anti-Western or global agenda, are now being listed by more states, with the 
leaders of these ideologies, such as Al Qa’ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), being universally listed by all states. Since this is a relatively newer wave of 
terrorism, state responses to this new threat have begun to change to reflect new realities 
in the counter terrorism strategies that must be adopted. Other groups, that do not adhere 
to this type of ideology are then still being listed only by the states who they are of 
immediate concern. This shows that the reasons for the listing pattern could exist on the 
side of the, changing, phenomenon of terrorism itself and not solely the states.  Meaning 
that newer, more global and ideologically based groups are special cases for counter 
terrorism, and this new threat allows states to form a different level of mutual 
understanding regarding this form of terrorism. This is another point of departure for 
future research on the topic, as there is the potential to formulate more qualitative studies 
across time periods and concerning how states identify with each other for counter 
terrorism purposes. However, a majority of listed groups are not purely ideologically 
driven and often have political goals in a target state, these are still listed in a highly 
individualized fashion by the listing states.   
                                                             
14 Rapoport, D. C. (2004). The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism (See Bibliography) 
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Another potential reason is that groups have different goals, and these are reflected in 
how the U.K. has responded to them. This study has been primarily from the state centric 
viewpoint and has not incorporated the vast number of different goals and groups types 
that exist around the world. As such it treated terrorists uniformly, as terrorist groups, 
however differences in characteristics may explain how states react.  In this way, each 
group may be listed due to unique justifications that suite the time, ideology, location, 
and actions of the group, therefore no one theory could necessarily attempt to capture the 
reasoning across the entire list, at the level of individual states, especially since groups 
have been added to the list during different years and governments. This would mean that 
the list itself must not be observed as a uniform, static document. The motivations for 
listing groups can span different areas from self-security, protection of other states, 
political decision making, and so on. Additionally,  
This is not to say that nothing can be said, a neo realist theoretical lens still explains the 
overall listing observations among states. This is important to note because no other 
hypothetical expectation provided an explanation of the observed variation in any 
significant sense at the level that Hypothesis A has. However, even though it has not 
explained the justifications in the individual listing of the British list it does not mean that 
this hypothesis is no longer relevant. One important consideration is that while references 
to Self may not have been used in a majority of the group justifications, the inclusion of 
certain groups can still be due to the self-interest of the United Kingdom, even if it is not 
explicitly referenced in the documentation. For instance, it may be in British interests to 
target terror groups that can destabilize certain governments. On the outward appearance 
it would seem that the British government is trying to protect these other states, however 
there is really an element of self to the motivation to do so because of non-stated interests 
in keeping that government secure. This means that further qualitative research is needed, 
particularly at the individual state level. The neo realist Hypothesis A explains the 
observations of the Comparative List, however it does not fully explain the observation 
of the individual list analysis. The explanations of the individual theoretical justification 
for including groups on a state list remains as a potential starting point for additional 
attempts at connecting external theories into terrorism listing research. 
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6. CONCLUSION   
This research set out to examine the potential for using international relations theory to 
explain variation between the listing regimes created by states. The goal has been to 
examine the variation between the listing regimes and how this variation can be 
explained. In other words, what explains the variation in the listings? In order to answer 
this question, three alternative hypotheses are put forward, each of them grounded in a 
particular theoretical tradition that provide differing explanations for the actions of states 
in the international system. These were then assed to measure their relative explanatory 
potential against observations of the state terror lists. Generally speaking, the analysis has 
provided noteworthy results in the form of imbedding international relations theory 
perspectives from Realism, the English School, and Constructivism into a discussion of 
state counter terrorism strategies. Additionally, the analysis proposes that for certain 
elements of understanding state listing regimes, particularly of how they are compared to 
other states lists, a neo realist viewpoint can offer insight. 
The examination was carried out in two different steps. Three different hypotheses, all 
based in relevant theoretical literature, were developed in an attempt to explain the 
possible levels of variation in the listing patterns between states. For Step 1, establishing 
an overall pattern among state terror lists, a comparative list was made to observe the 
potential variation between five state’s lists and to determine which hypothesis best 
matched the observed variation between lists. The lists selected for this were officially 
published by the governments of Australia, Russia, India, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. Based on the observations made regarding the comparative list, the 
hypothesis with the highest degree of explanatory power was selected. In this case it was 
Hypothesis A which articulated that states lists would reflect a high degree of 
individuality based on the assumptions from the Neo Realist view on International 
Relations. This best explains the observed level of variation among the lists and provides 
a theoretical framework for understanding state terror lists. The other two hypotheses, 
one assuming that states would work together to protect the international society of states, 
established by the English School, and another positing that states lists would show 
groupings of states based on collective identity formation based around Constructivism, 
did not match to such a high degree. 
69 
 
The process of finding and detailing the level of variation among state lists was 
successful. After compiling and analyzing the five state’s terror lists an observable trend 
was apparent and a corresponding hypothesis was selected. The individual lists were 
formatted and placed in a Comparative List (Appendix 1) that shows the groups and the 
listing states. Based on the observations of these five state lists, there is a high degree of 
individuality concerning listing patterns. While there are some groups that are universally 
listed by all countries, the trend developed that groups are more likely to be listed by 
fewer states. Overall a group is most likely to be listed by a single state. This is a Neo 
Realist premise, therefore, the overall pattern seems to correspond most closely to 
Hypothesis A. This occurred throughout the analysis and is observable between all five 
states, as well as between members of collective security arrangements such as NATO. 
Additionally, when viewing the three states that had the most similar lists there was still 
an apparent level of individuality for each state list. Only three groups are listed 
universally by all five states, and some are listed by combinations of 2,3, or 4 states.  More 
significantly, most groups appear on only one state’s list. Due to these factors it was 
observed that the state’s lists have significant levels of variations, and despite the 
relationships between the states themselves, there remains a high level of individuality 
when it comes to creating their lists. These observations are most explained by Hypothesis 
A, offering a Neo Realist view, which contained the most explanatory potential among 
the three hypothesis for explaining the observed variation among the listing patterns.     
Then for Step 2, the in depth analysis of the list that provided the best case for the 
hypothesis, the list which provided the best example of Hypothesis A in action was 
selected to be further analyzed. This list, which correspondingly was the U.K.’s 
proscribed terror organization list, was examined using content analysis to qualitatively 
determine whether the justification’s given for including groups on the list matched the 
hypothetical and theoretical expectations established by Hypothesis A. This was 
accomplished by using content analysis on the provided justification for placing a group 
on the terror list. The content analysis frame concerned issues of referencing other states, 
self, and general references. These categories have been covered in greater detail in the 
previous sections, however the general aim was to provide a clear indication of the subject 
of the justification for including a group on the list to see if it aligned with the hypothesis’ 
expectations of being self-focused and concerned with national interests or security. The 
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goal of this was to verify if the hypothesis selected based on the initial observations, held 
true to the individual level state list analysis.          
The analysis of step 2, which focused on examining one list that most closely emulated 
the observations from step 1, however showed that if analyzed qualitatively, the 
motivations of the listing pattern do not correspond with what the theory initially lead us 
to expect. In fact, the results of this analysis indicate that while the U.K. is most 
representative of the hypothesis among a comparative list of states, the justifications that 
follows within the listing document do not match the reasons that the hypothesis is based 
upon. Upon a detailed analysis of the content of the U.K.’s list it has been determined that 
the assumption that the British list is individual and distinct from other lists due solely to 
self-interest is not sufficient in explaining the individual listing pattern. This could be 
because the justifications do not represent the real motivation and that the ‘true’ 
motivation can be derived from the pattern and observed behavior. Many of the groups 
that are listed solely by the United Kingdom are not justified due to any apparent 
connection to the British state, it’s citizens, or their security. 
 Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the list is primarily concerned with the actions of 
groups in other countries, operating outside of the United Kingdom, that target other states 
citizens. This is particularly relevant since many of the groups included on the British list 
do not themselves declare that the United Kingdom is included in their goals or ambitions. 
While there are some groups listed due to their belief in global jihad, or anti-Western 
movements, a striking number are listed who have a primary focus on challenging a 
regime in another country. The justification provided by the British government for 
including such groups does not identify any connection to the British state, citizens, or 
interests for most of these groups, thus the assumption based upon neo realist principles 
of international relations theory do not fully explain the results of this individual list. 
Upon analysis, the individual list shows a higher degree of concern for the terror threat 
posed to other states than was initially assumed due to the hypothetical indications.   
This means that, while it is possible to observe variation and establish patterns among the 
lists generally and explain the variation on a comparative level, the reasons for these lists 
being individually different is still subject to debate, since multiple elements of the neo 
realist, English school, and constructivist theories were present in the motivations for 
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listing. The neo realist perspective explains the observation that the lists will be different 
from each other because each state is different and has different goals, i.e. each has their 
own survival and security at heart and it explains the pattern at the systemic level. 
However, upon a closer inspection of an individual list this does not appear to be the case, 
since the U.K.’s list does not reflect a large amount of self-references when justifying 
groups. Rather, the U.K.’s list reflects a variety of positions within the justifications and 
the tendency is to reference other states. This lends itself to a more Constructivist 
understanding of international relations, as Hypothesis C proposed. In this sense, the 
U.K.’s list in particular presents a conundrum. When compared against a grouping of state 
lists it provides an excellent example of the neo realist based hypothesis, yet when it is 
closely analyzed it offers connections to other theoretical viewpoints as well. A reason 
for this may be that these International Relations theories are designed to explain the big 
picture and are not best for determining a particular state’s policy at any given moment 
in time. To this end, while one of the theories provides insight into the differences 
between state’s terror lists, no one hypothesis fully explains the justifications that 
contribute to an individual group’s listing and the comparative list simultaneously. In 
order to go to the state level, further research is required on the individual lists, using 
other theories or approaches that cater to analyzing the actions and choices of individual 
states.   
The second step of analysis brought into view the complexities of applying theories to the 
motivation and justification for an individual state’s listing regime. Even though it did 
not substantiate the proposed hypothesis and theory, the work conducted for the theory 
testing yielded interesting results. Firstly, there has been an attempt to bridge the gap in 
the literature and theory concerning terrorism studies, and more specifically how states 
understand counter terrorism. The system-level theories from the English School, 
Constructivism, and Realism have all been incorporated into understanding how state 
terror lists should operate. Additionally, one of these theories, neo realism, has 
subsequently provides some level of explanatory potential for the observed variations 
among the lists. Yet, the hypothesis derived from this theory does not fully explain the 
content of a list itself.  
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This research has laid the groundwork for further examinations of state terror lists and the 
motivations for including, or potentially not including, terror groups on official listing 
regimes. Further research can be carried out that attempts to connect theories to the 
justifications of the individual state lists. Ideally, a larger study based on the design 
established in this paper could examine the justifications from multiple state lists in order 
to establish a more substantial theoretical connection. Alternatively, different theories of 
international relations can be applied within the same framework that has been used to 
test Neo Realism, the English School, and Constructivist ideas. In a sense this can be 
repeated with different hypotheses based on theories from many different disciplines in 
order to seek the theory with the highest level of explanatory power for both steps. 
Terror listing regimes, while highly relevant for contemporary international politics, 
remains an area in demand of further investigation, and theorizing in particular. In this 
study, initial steps were made, but more remains to be done. Despite the intricacies 
terrorism poses to any attempt at theorizing, I still encourage further research along these 
lines, especially for International Relations and Terrorism studies to enter into more 
collaboration. For terrorism, to theorize better state response in a (still) largely state-
centric world. For International Relations to, include, and gain analytical grip, on 
terrorism and how terrorism shapes dynamics of contemporary international relations. 
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8. APPENDICES 
8.1 APPENDIX 1: COMPARATIVE LIST 
Individual Lists Sources: 
Australia: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx 
United Kingdom: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-
organisations--2 
Russia: http://en.nac.gov.ru/unified-federal-list-organizations-including-foreign-and-
international-designated-terrorist-courts.html 
India: http://mha.nic.in/BO 
United States: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
 
Comprehensive List: Times Listed    
1 Time 2 Times 3 Times 4 Times 5 Times (All States)  
98 27 14 4 3   
67.10% 18.50% 9.60% 2.70% 2.10%   
       
3 State (here meaning AUS, U.S.A, and the U.K.) Times Listed:  
1 Time 2 Times 3 Times (All States)    
59 25 17 Totals 101   
58.40% 24.80% 16.80%     
       
NATO        
1 Time 2 Times (Both States)    
65 36 Totals 101    
64.40% 35.60%      
 
Comparative List: 
Group Names AUS RF IND U.S.A. U.K. 
17 November Revolutionary Organisation (N17)     
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)     
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)     
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)     
Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES)      
Al Badr      
Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)      
All Tripura Tiger Force      
Al Mulathamun Battalion      
Ajnad Misr     
Al Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI)     
Al Ghurabaa     
Al Haramain      
Al Ittihad Al Islamia (AIAI)     
Al Murabitun     
Al Nusrah Front (Jabhat al-Nusra)     
79 
 
Al Qaida (AQ)     
Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent      
Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)      
Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)      
Al Shabaab     
Al Umar-Mujahideen      
Ansar al Dine (AAD)   
 
  
Ansar al Islam (AAI)     
Ansar al Shari'a in Benghazi     
Ansar al Shari'a in Darnah      
Ansar al Shari'a in Tunisia     
Ansar al Sunna (AS)     
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM)     
Ansaru     
Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée) (GIA)     
Army of Islam (AOI)      
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)     
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)      
Autonomous combat terrorist organization (ACTO)      
Babbar Khalsa (BK)     
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)     
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)     
Boko Haram     
Communist Party of India (Maoist)      
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) -- People’s 
War      
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army 
(CPP/NPA)      
Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan      
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)      
Deendar Anjuman      
Dukhtaran-E-Millat (DEM)      
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)     
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG)      
Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA)      
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) including GIMF 
Banlga Team      
Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM)     
HAMAS      
Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades     
Harakat-Ul-Jihad-Ul-Islami (Bangladesh) (HUJI-B)     
Harakat-Ul-Mujahideen/Alami (HuM/A))     
Harakat Mujahideen (HM)  ( a.k.a. Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA), 
Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen, Harakat-Ul-Ansar)      
Haqqani Network (HQN)     
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)     
Hizballah      
Hizballah's External Security Organisation (ESO)     
Hizballah Military Wing     
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Hizb-Ul-Mujahideen/ Hizb-Ul-Mujahideen Pir Panjal 
Regiment      
Hizb ut-Tahrir      
Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)     
Imarat Kavkaz (IK) (The Caucasus Emirate)     
Indian Mujahedeen (IM)     
International Sikh Youth Federation      
Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)     
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)     
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)     
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)     
ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K)      
ISIL's Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya)      
ISIL Sinai Province      
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)     
Jamaah Anshorut Daulah     
Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA)     
Jamaat-e-Islami      
Jammat Mujahideen      
Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)     
Jamaat Ul-Furquan (JuF)     
Jamiat Ihya at-Turaz al-Islami (The Revival of Islamic 
Heritage Society)      
Jamiat al-Islah al-Idzhtimai  (The Social Reform Society)      
Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen      
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front      
Jaysh al Khalifatu Islamiya (JKI)     
Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)      
Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)      
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)     
Jundallah     
Jund al-Aqsa (JAA) which translates as “Soldiers of al-
Aqsa”     
Jund al Khalifa-Algeria (JaK-A) which translates as 
Soldiers of the Caliphate     
Jund al-Sham (The Force of Greater Syria)      
Kahane Chai (Kach)      
Kamatapur Liberation Organization      
Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup (KYKL)      
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)      
Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)      
Kateeba al-Kawthar (KaK) also known as ‘Ajnad al-sham’ 
and ‘Junud ar-Rahman alMuhajireen’      
Khalistan Commando Force      
Khalistan Zindabad Force      
Khuddam Ul-Islam (Kul)     
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)     
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) (Lashkar e Jhangvi)     
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) or  Lashkar-e-Taiba     
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)     
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Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)     
Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF)      
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)      
Minbar Ansar Deen (also known as Ansar al-Sharia UK)     
The Minin and Pozharsky Public Militia Movement       
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) which translates as Mujahideen 
of Eastern Indonesia    
Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem 
(MSC)      
Muslim Brotherhood      
National Action     
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) in Assam      
National Liberation Army (ELN)      
National Liberation Front of Tripura      
National Socialist Council of Nagaland, NSCN (K)      
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)      
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)     
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)      
People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)      
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)      
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command (PFLP-GC)     
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)      
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)      
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)     
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)      
Right Sector (a structural subdivision of the organization in the 
Republic of Crimea)     
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)     
Saved Sect or Saviour Sect     
Shining Path (SL)      
Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)     
Students Islamic Movement of India      
The Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the United 
Mujahideen Forces of the Caucasus      
The Taliban      
Tamil Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA)      
Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT)      
Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari'at Muhammadi (TNSM)     
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)     
Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK)     
Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)     
Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C)     
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)      
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)      
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8.2 APPENDIX 2: CONTENT ANALYSIS FORM 
Content Analysis Form 
 Group Name Sentence  Key Words Classification 
1 17 November 
Revolutionary 
Organisation (N17) 
   
  2 oppose - Greek military; anti-US Other States 
2 Abdallah Azzam Brigades 
(AAB) 
   
  1 aligned with - global jihad 
movement;  
General  
  1 fighting in - Syria and Lebanon Other States 
  2 Operating - Pakistan Other States 
  4 attack, into - Israel Other States 
  5 bombing - Iranian embassy; in - 
Beirut 
Other States 
  6 bombings - Iranian cultural 
center; in - Beirut; revenge for 
actions by - Iran, Hizballah 
Other States 
  7 threatened, demanded - 
Lebanese Government 
Other States 
  7 threatened attacks - Western 
targets 
General 
3 Abu Nidal Organization 
(ANO) 
   
  1 destruction - Israel Other States 
  2 hostile - 'reactionary' Arab 
regimes, states supporting Israel 
Other States 
4 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)    
  1 in - Southern Phillippine island of 
Mindanao 
Other States 
5 Ajnad Misr    
  1 based in - Egypt Other States 
  2 protect - Egyptian muslims Other States 
  2 avenge, abuse by - Egyptian 
security services 
Other States 
  3 attacked - Egyptian checkpoint Other States 
  4 attacks - Egyptian security forces Other States 
  6 attacks - Greater Cairo Other States 
  7 bombing - Cairo University Other States 
6 Al Gama'at al-Islamiya 
(GI) 
   
  1 overthrow - Egyptian government Other States 
  2 removal - Western influence General 
7 Al Ghurabaa    
  2 emerged, in - U.K. Self 
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  4 based, operates within - U.K. Self 
8 Al Ittihad Al Islamia 
(AIAI) 
   
  1 establish, in - Somalia; regain - 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia 
Other States 
  2 aligned themselves with - 'global 
jihad' ideology 
General 
9 Al Murabitun    
  1 active in - Mali, Algeria Other States 
  3 unite Muslims - 'Nile to the 
Atlantic' 
General 
  5 death of - over thirty people 
including Britons 
Self 
  6 targeted - uranium mine (supplies 
French reactors) 
Other States 
  8 fight, in - Mali, West Africa Other States 
10 Al Qaida (AQ)    
  1 destruction - Israel Other States 
  1 expulsion of - Western forces 
from Saudi Arabia; end - Western 
influence in the Muslim world 
General 
11 Al Shabaab    
  1 based in - Somalia Other States 
  1 campaign against - Somali 
transitional Federal Government 
and African Union 
Other States 
  2 in -Somalia Other States 
  2 intention - global jihad General 
12 Ansar AL Islam    
  1 from - Iraq Other States 
  2 anti - Western General 
  2 opposes - US, Washington Other States 
  3 operations against - Multinational 
Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) 
Self 
  3 operations against - Multinational 
Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) 
Other States 
13 Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi 
(AAS-B) 
   
  1 anti - Western General 
  4 attacks - civilian targets; in - 
eastern Libya 
Other States 
  5 attack against - US special 
mission; killing - US ambassador, 
3 Americans 
Other States 
  8 denounce - American military 
forces 
Other States 
  9 attack - US diplomatic compound Other States 
  10 threat to - Libya Other States 
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  10 threat to -Western interests General 
  11 US designated - AAS-B Other States 
  11 UN listed - AAS-B General 
14 Ansar AL Sharia-Tunisia 
(AAS-T) 
   
  2 In- Tunisia Other States 
  2 eliminate - Western influence General 
  6 attack - US Embassy Other States 
  8 attacks on - US Embassy and 
American School; in - Tunis 
Other States 
  9 assasination - National Coalition 
Assembly members 
Other States 
  10 in - Sousse Other States 
  10 attempted, attack  -  British 
tourists  
Self 
15 Ansar AL Sunna (AS)    
  1 based in - Iraq, Kurdish 
Autonomous Zone (KAZ) 
Other States 
  2 expel - all foreign influences from 
Iraq 
Other States 
  2 expel - all foreign influences from 
Iraq 
Self 
16 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis    
  1 based in - Sinai region of Egypt Other States 
  3 attacks on - Egyptian security 
forces; in - Egypt 
Other States 
  5 attacks in - Cairo; against - Israel Other States 
  8 attack - Egyptian Interior Minister Other States 
  8 UK national - injured Self 
  9 attack in - Mamsoura  Other States 
  10 South Koreans, Egyptian - died Other States 
17 Ansaru    
  1 based in - Nigeria Other States 
  2 anti - Nigerian Government Other States 
  2 anti - Western agenda General 
     
18 Armed Islamic Group 
(Groupe Islamique 
Armée) (GIA) 
   
  1 in - Algeria Other States 
19 Asbat Al-Ansar    
  1 within - Lebanon Other States 
20 Babbar Khalsa (BK)    
  1 within - Punjab region of India Other States 
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21 Basque Homeland and 
Liberty (Euskadi ta 
Askatasuna) (ETA) 
   
  1 in - Spain and France Other States 
22 Baluchistan Liberation 
Army (BLA) 
   
  1 based in - Eastern Pakistan Other States 
23 Boko Haram (BH)    
  1 based in - Nigeria Other States 
  1 targeted - Nigerian society Other States 
24 Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
(EIJ) 
   
  1 overthrow - Egyptian government Other States 
  2 allied itself to - 'global jihad'; 
threatened - Western interests 
General 
25 Global Islamic Media 
Front (GIMF) including 
GIMF Banlga Team  
   
  1 around - the world General 
  5 murders - Bangladeshi-American Other States 
  6 hit list of individuals - Britain Self 
  6 hit list of individuals - Germany, 
America, Canada, Sweden 
Other States 
26 Groupe Islamique 
Combattant Marocain 
(GICM) 
   
  1 replace - Moroccan monarchy Other States 
  2 global - extremist agenda General 
27 Hamas Izz al-Din al-
Qassem Brigades 
   
  1 end - Israeli occupation; in - 
Palestine 
Other States 
28 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami 
(HUJI) 
   
  1 accession of - Kashmir to 
Pakistan; spread terror - 
throughout India 
Other States 
  2 targeted - Indian security 
position; in - Kashmir; in - India 
proper 
Other States 
29 Harakat-Ul-Jihad-Ul-
Islami (Bangladesh) 
(HUJI-B) 
   
  1 in - Bangladesh Other States 
30 Harakat-Ul-
Mujahideen/Alami 
(HuM/A) (and Jundallah) 
   
  1 rejection of - democracy General 
  1 accession of - Kashmir to Pakistan Other States 
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  2 anti - western General 
  2 anti - President Musharraf  Other States 
31 Harakat Mujahideen 
(HM) 
   
  1 independence for - Indian-
administered Kashmir 
Other States 
  2 attacks against - US Other States 
  2 attacks against - Western 
interests 
General 
32 Haqqani Network (HQN)    
  1 in - Afghanistan Other States 
  2 eradicate - Western influence; 
disrupt western military, political 
efforts 
General 
  3 Demanding US forces - withdraw Other States 
  3 Demanding Coalition Forces - 
withdraw 
Self 
  8 attack against - British Embassy 
vehicle; killed - UK national; killed 
- UK Embassy staff 
Self 
  9 target Kabul due to - UK interests Self 
  9 target Kabul due to - Western 
interests 
General 
  10 banned by - USA, Canada Other States 
  10 banned by - UN General 
33 Hizballah Military Wing    
  1 armed resistance -  state of Israel; 
seize - Palestinian territories and 
Jerusalem; from - Israel 
Other States 
  2 supports - terrorism; in - Iraq, 
Palestinian territories 
Other States 
34 Hezb-E islami Gulbuddin 
(HIG) 
   
  1 anti - American Other States 
  1 anti - Western General 
35 Imarat Kavkaz (IK) (aka 
Caucasus Emirate 
   
  1 across - North Caucasus Other States 
  2 attacks against - Russian state 
and civilians  
Other States 
  3 attack on - Domedodevo airport 
in Moscow; suicide attack - 
Moscow Metro  
Other States 
  3 killed - British National Self 
  4 terrorist activity in - Russia Other States 
36 Indian Mujahideen (IM)    
  1 establish - Islamic State; in - India Other States 
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37 Islamic Army of Aden 
(IAA) 
   
  1 overthrow - Yemeni government Other States 
38 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)    
  1 elimination - Uzbek regime Other States 
39 Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) 
   
  1 establish - Islamic state; in - 
Uzbekistan 
Other States 
  2 over entire - Turkestan area Other States 
40 ISIL/ ISIS/ DAISh    
  1 active in - Iraq, Syria Other States 
  2 global - jihadist ideology; anti - 
western 
General 
  3 establish - Islamic state;  in - the 
region; impose - rule; on - people  
Other States 
  7 poses a threat within - Syria; 
advances  in - Iraq 
Other States 
  8 threat in - Iraq, Syria Other States 
  9 British nationals - fighting with 
ISIL 
Self 
  10 treating Iraq and Syria - theater of 
conflict 
Other States 
  10 operate - across border; cause - 
concern for whole international 
community 
General 
  11 series of blasts - in Baghdad Other States 
  13 Thousands of Iraqi civilians - lost 
their lives; ISIL have accounted - 
for a large portion of these 
deaths 
Other States 
  14 detained - foreign journalists and 
aid workers 
General 
  16 captured - Ramadi, Fallujah; 
fighting - Iraqi security forces 
Other States 
  17 car bomb - in Southern Beirut  Other States 
  18 presence in - northern and 
eastern Syria 
Other States 
  19 responsible - numerous attacks 
and a vast number of deaths 
General 
  20 attract foreign fighters - including 
Westerners 
General 
  21 Maintained control - towns 
Syrian/ Turkish border 
Other States 
  21 interfered - free flow of 
humanitarian aid 
General 
41 Jaish e Mohammed 
(JeM) and Khuddam UI-
Islam (KuI) 
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  1 Liberation - of Kashmir from 
Indian control; Descruction of - 
America and India 
Other States 
  2 Unifying - kashmiri militant 
groups 
Other States 
42 Jamaah Anshorut Daulah    
  1 merger of - Indonesian extremist Other States 
  2 recruits fighters in - Syria Other States 
  3 close ties - Daesh General 
  5 responsible - Bali attacks Other States 
  6 attack - Sarinah Mall in Jakarta Other States 
43 Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA)    
  2 establish Islamic caliphate in - 
Pakistan; to - indian subcontinent 
Other States 
  2 entend - global jihad General 
  3 grenade attack on - Muttahida 
Quami Movement (MQM); In 
Karachi; Killed - members of 
Sindh assembly; twin bombing 
targeting - volunteers 
Other States 
  4 attack on - Pakistan side of 
Wagah border crossing 
Other States 
  5 criticising - British government; 
treat Muslims in - Britain 
Self 
  6 fatal attacks on - Christian sites; 
in - Lahore 
Other States 
44 Jammat-ul Mujahideen 
Bangladesh (JMB) 
   
  2 fatal - bomb attacks; across - 
Bangladesh 
Other States 
45 Jamaat UI-Furguan (JuF)    
  1 unite Indian administered 
Kashmir with - Pakistan; establish 
- Islamic state in Pakistan; 
destruction of - India, USA; recruit 
- jihadis; release - Kashmiri 
militarnts 
Other States 
46 Jaysh al Khalifatu 
Islamiya (JKI) 
   
  2 active in - Syria Other States 
  6 assisted - ANF, ISIL  General 
  7 British individuals - carried out 
suicide attack 
Self 
  7 in -Aleppo Other States 
47 Jeemah Islamiyah (JI)    
  1 in - Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Souther 
Philippines 
Other States 
48 Jund al-Aqsa (JAA)     
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  1 active in - Syria; against - Syrian 
government 
Other States 
  3 operating in - Idlib and Hama Other States 
  4 attack in - Maan village Other States 
  6 seize - Hama airport Other States 
  7 attack that targeted - resort hotel  General 
49 Jund al Khalifa-Algeria 
(JaK-A) 
   
  2 allegiance to - ISIL General 
  3 ambush - convoy; killed 11 
members - Algerian army 
Other States 
  4 beheaded - French national Other States 
  5 target - Western citizens General 
  5 target - Americans, French Other States 
50 Kateeba al-Kawthar 
(KaK) 
   
  1 from - more than 20 countries; 
seeking - just Islamic Nation 
General 
  2 fighting in - Syria Other States 
  3 aligned to - extreme groups & Al 
Qa'ida 
General 
  4 Western - Mujaadid commander General 
  5 attrack - Western foreign fighters General 
51 Partiya Karkeren 
Kurdistani (PKK) 
   
  1 in - southeast Turkey Other States 
52 Laskar e Tayyaba (LT)    
  1 seeks - independence for 
Kashmir; creation of - Islamic 
state 
Other States 
53 Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Elam (LTTE) 
   
  1 in - North and East of Sri Lanka Other States 
54 Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group (LIFG) 
   
  1 replace - Libyan regime Other States 
  2 part of - global Islamist extremist 
movement 
General 
  3 mounted operations - inside 
Libya; attempt to assassinate - 
Qadhafi 
Other States 
55 Minbar Ansar Deen 
(Ansar al-Sharia UK) 
   
  1 based in - UK; promotes and 
encourages - terrorism 
Self 
56 Mujahidin Indonesia 
Timur (MIT)  
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  1 based in - Poso, in Central 
Sulawesi 
Other States 
  2 leader- indonesia's most wanted 
terrorists 
Other States 
  3 attack - police and army Other States 
  4 Responsible - deaths of police 
officers; in - Poso 
Other States 
  5 Kidnapping, beheading - Christian 
farmers; in -Poso 
Other States 
  6 pledged its allegiance - to Daesh General 
  7 threatened attacks - across the 
country 
Other States 
57 National Action    
  2 across - UK Self 
  5 promotes idea that - Britain will 
see violent 'race war' 
Self 
  6 hostile - British state, rejects - 
democracy; endorsing - violence 
against ethnic minorities 
Self 
58 Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
- Shaqaqi (PIJ) 
   
  1 end - Israeli occupation of 
Palestine; create - Islamic state 
Other States 
  2 opposes - existance of the State 
of Israel, Middle East peace 
process, and Palestinian 
Authority, bombings - Israeli 
targets 
Other States 
59 Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine - 
General Command 
(PFLP-GC) 
   
  2 based in - Syria; involved with - 
Palestine intifada  
Other States 
  5 fighting in - Syrian War; support - 
Assad 
Other States 
  6 in support of - Syrian 
government, Hizballah, and Iran 
Other States 
60 Revolutionary People's 
Liberation Party - Front  
   
  1 in - Turkey Other States 
61 Salafist Group for Call 
and Combat 
   
  1 in - Algeria Other States 
62 Saved Sect/ Saviour Sect    
  2 in the - UK Self 
  4 based and operates within - UK Self 
63 Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan 
(SSP) 
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  1 transform - Pakistan Other States 
  2 destruction of other religions - 
Judiasm, Christianity, and 
Hinduism 
General 
64 Tehrik Nefaz-e Sharia'at 
Muhammadi (TNSM) 
   
  1 attacks - coalition Self 
  1 attacks - Afghan forces; in-
Afghanistan 
Other States 
  1  support to - Al Qa'ida, Taliban General 
  2 suicide attack - army comound; in 
- pakistan; killing - 42 soldiers 
Other States 
65 Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) 
   
  1 in - Pakistan, Afghanistan Other States 
  2 resistance against - Pakistani 
army 
Other States 
  2  removal - NATO forces from 
Afghanistan 
Self 
  3 attacks in - the west General 
  3 attempted - Times Square car-
bomb 
Other States 
66 Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan 
(TAK) 
   
  1 operating in - Turkey Other States 
67 Turkestan Islamic Party 
(TIP) 
   
  1 in -Western China Other States 
  3 based in - Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan; 
operates in - China, central and 
asouth Asia, Syria 
Other States 
  4 attacks in - China Other States 
  5 links to - Al Qa'ida General 
  6 jihad against - Chinese authorities Other States 
  8 presence in - Syrian war Other States 
  11 in - Syria Other States 
  13 banned by - UN General 
  13 sanctioned by - USA Other States 
68 Turkiye Halk Kurtulus 
Partisis-Cephesi (THKP-C) 
   
  2 grew out of - Turkish extreme left 
movements 
Other States 
  3 fighting in - Syria Other States 
  4 attack in - Reyhanli, Turkey Other States 
  5 prominent in - Southern province 
of Hatay 
Other States 
  6 responsible for - Banias Massacre Other states 
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